Staffordshire Prepared

# Multi-Agency Incident Handbook

**CO-LOCATE**

Co-locate with other responders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location.

**COMMUNICATE**

Communicate using language which is clear, and free from technical jargon and abbreviations.

**CO-ORDINATE**

Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead organisation. Identify priorities, resources, capabilities and limitations for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings.

**JOINTLY UNDERSTAND RISK**

Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards, to agree appropriate control measures.

**SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**

Establish shared situational awareness by using M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model.

**In an emergency, please refer to the incident activation flowchart on page 28 and your organisation's response/Business Continuity Plans and/or the Staffordshire Prepared Strategic Leaders'/Tactical Leaders' Guide.**

**Version 10.0 – December 2023**

## Foreword

Welcome to the Staffordshire Resilience Forum (SRF) partnership's Multi-Agency Incident Handbook. The Handbook is designed to help anyone working within the partnership to understand how the responder community of Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent prepares itself for and responds to incidents[1].

In 2023, the handbook's format has changed to reflect the dual focus the SRF's activity; preparedness and response/recovery in line with the guidance that accompanies the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Since the last review of the document, the SRF and its partners have worked through unprecedented challenges such as the Covid pandemic and other concurrent incidents. It has invested in learning from both local and national learning to drive change. Therefore, there are many new inclusions in this version as well as updates to existing content to ensure the SRF's core document and operating methodology is relevant and in line with current guidance.

Our recent experiences have highlighted that the local embedding of JESIP into our values and procedures, along with a flexible approach to response ensures that the SRF as a preparedness structure can pivot into a formal response Strategic/Tactical Coordinating Group structure, flexible to local demands. The handbook supports this transition and outlines the activation process which unfortunately, has been tested frequently since the last version. The handbook still recognises that not all incidents are declared as "major incidents" but require or would benefit from a multi-agency co-ordination. The ethos of collective, co-ordinated response is applied to any incident throughout its lifecycle just as JESIP teaches from operational response and upwards through tactical and strategic levels of co-ordination.

The Handbook is aimed at a number of target audiences. First and foremost, it is designed to assist contingency planners in writing effective plans that complement the partnership's multi-agency structures. Beyond this, the Handbook provides a useful overview to staff who are completely new to Civil Contingencies or are perhaps newly arrived in the area. Finally, the handbook now outlines how the move to response is achieved and outlines the coordination of associated activity.

No matter who is reading this document, the Handbook is structured in a way that is accessible yet necessarily comprehensive. In simple terms, it promotes interoperability by answering the fundamental question, 'How do we do preparedness and response in Staffordshire & Stoke-on-Trent?'

I hope that you find the Handbook useful and would welcome your feedback on it at any time.

**Bethan Morgan**

Director
Civil Contingencies Unit

[1] The Handbook accepts the existence of the terms 'Emergency', 'Major Incident', Major Emergency and 'Disruptive Challenge' across multi-agency response and recovery. The Handbook views all terms as interchangeable, and therefore referring to the legal definition of a circumstance described as an 'Emergency' in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Part 1 – 1 "Meaning of Emergency'.

## Contents – refer to p. 67-70 for full index

# Document management

### Security classification

This document has been marked as 'OFFICIAL' under the HM Government Security Classification.

### Version Control

| Version | Date Circulated | Available to: |
|---|---|---|
| 001 | October 2009 | SRF Partners |
| 002 | October 2012 | Public |
| 003 | May 2014 | Public |
| 004 | September 2016 | Public |
| 005 | September 2017 | Public |
| 006 | July 2019 | Public |
| 6.1 – 6.5 | Feb – Mar-2023 | Working drafts |
| 6.6 | May 2023 | Final draft to SRF T -post consultation. 11/05/23 SRF approval for immediate use |
| 007 | 11 May 2023 | SRF Partners for immediate use |
| 7.1 | June 2023 | Minor consultation feedback changes only |
| 7.2 | June 2023 | Minor change as agreed at June 23 SRF |
| 8.0 | July 2023 | Published on RD and Staffs Prepared for use |
| 9.0 | Sept 23 | Minor update - BTP details added to the handbook |
| 10.0 | Dec 23 | Minor update to diagram 6 |

Printed versions of this document are considered uncontrolled. To ensure you have the most up-to-date copy of the document check ResilienceDirect, or contact the CCU on 01785 898618.

### Document control

Supersedes version 8.0

### Document Location

https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home/66036/Multi-Agency-Incident-Handbook

### Legislative drivers / relevant guidance

Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Emergency Preparedness
Emergency Response and Recovery

**Resilience Standards**

#1 LRF governance and support arrangements
#6 Interoperability
#12 Strategic Co-ordinating Group

**Review date**

This document has been produced by the Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit on behalf of the Staffordshire Resilience Forum. It is subject to an annual review, or additionally as required.

**Acknowledgements**

This document is the result of the contributions of SRF partners who have added content to this, and previous versions as well as submissions through the consultation period. Thanks are given to each organisation for their direct and indirect support.

**Distribution list**

The Multi-Agency Incident Handbook is available across the SRF Partnership and to the general public via electronic distribution. The most up-to-date copy can always be accessed via the Staffordshire Resilience Forum pages of ResilienceDirect or by contacting the CCU direct on 01785 898618.

**People impact assessment**

The SRF is committed to promoting an environment that values diversity. All organisations that may be required to respond to an incident must ensure that anyone involved is treated equally and fairly and not discriminated against on the grounds of any of the protected characteristics as detailed by the Equality Act 2010.

**Training**

Initial briefing: Lunch and Learn session 12 May 2023; and
https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home/292681/Resilience-Learning-Hub

**Validation / exercise**

Ex FORTITUDE – May 2023 (operational day) and October 2023

**Enquiries and updates**

Any enquiries or updates should be directed to the Civil Contingencies Unit at
ccu@staffordshirefire.gov.uk

# 1 Introduction

In the latest version this handbook has been split into two parts namely:

- Part one – Preparedness
- Part two – Emergency Response and Recovery

This is to mirror the national guidance that supports the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) and to enable the reader to go directly to the response section in an emergency.

The Incident Handbook is the core document outlining how the SRF operates in periods of both preparedness and response and promotes consistency of multi-agency preparation for, response to and recovery from, incidents in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent.

## 1.1 Scope

This document has been produced to outline how the SRF prepares for, responds to and recovers from a significant incident that affects, or has the potential to affect, one or more partner organisations. It does not outline the actions to be taken by organisations or individuals operating for them from a single agency perspective but only in a multi-agency setting.

The handbook provides guidance to assist responders in the event of any incident from minor to Major Incident or Emergency and sets out the concept of local operations such as SRF command and control procedures.

The content reflects current legislation and guidance but the SRF is aware that change through a review of the CCA and other legislations will prompt further revision.

## 1.2 Aim

The aim of the Incident Handbook is to promote a clear and consistent understanding of preparedness, response and recovery arrangements in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent.

## 1.3 Objectives

To achieve this aim, the objectives of the Incident Handbook are to:

- Provide key information and underpinning knowledge in a way that is clear, consistent and simple to understand.
- Promote sharing of information across the responder community of the SRF partnership.
- Define the legislative requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
- Define the national and sub-national arrangements for preparing for and responding to a major incident or emergency.
- Define how the SRF partnership prepares for, responds to and recovers from incidents.
- Define the responsibilities of responder organisations in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
- Provide an overview of key concepts used in multi-agency response such as JESIP.

## 2 Ownership and audience

The handbook is a multi-agency document that is produced by the CCU on behalf of the SRF partnership.

The handbook will be reviewed annually by the CCU. Reviews outside of this cycle could also be prompted by (not exhaustive):

- Major changes in the Community Risk Register (CRR).
- New threat assessments.
- Lessons identified from incidents, exercises or training and debriefing.
- Restructuring of organisations or procedures.
- Changes in legislation, national policy or guidance documents.
- Changes to related plans impacting on the Handbook.
- Alterations as directed by the Chair of the SRF and / or Director of Civil Contingencies.

The handbook is intended for use by all organisations within the SRF partnership that could support the response to, and recovery from, a multi-agency incident.

## 3 HM Government Security classifications

Under the Government Security Classification, information assets are classified into OFFICIAL (or OFFICIAL SENSITIVE), SECRET and TOP SECRET.

All public sector and certain private sector organisations are required to adopt and actively use the security classifications when producing documentation, presentations, conducting verbal conversations and passing information between organisations or to the public. The same security classifications are used for SRF documentation. For further information on how to use the new security classifications and how to disseminate information, please go to: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-security-classifications.

# PART ONE: PREPAREDNESS

# 4 National Arrangements for Civil Contingencies

## 4.1 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 2004)

The CCA 2004, and accompanying non-legislative measures, delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom[2]. The Act is separated into two substantive parts: Local Arrangements for Civil Protection (Part 1) and Emergency Powers (Part 2).

- Part 1 of the Act defines an emergency and outlines the two main categories of responders Category 1 and Category 2 responders (usually referred to as Cat 1/Cat 2 responders)) and specifically what the statutory duties placed on Cat 1 and Cat 2 responders are.

- Part 2 of the Act, updates the 1920 Emergency Powers Act to allow for the making of temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious emergencies. The use of Emergency Powers is a last resort option and planning arrangements at the local level should not assume that emergency powers will be made available. Their use is subject to a robust set of safeguards - they can only be deployed in exceptional circumstances.

Annexes A, B and C outline the main Cat 1, Cat 2 and other responders respectively, as defined by the CCA 2004, and their respective duties under the Act.

## 4.2 Other legislation

Guidance[3] that accompanies the CCA recognises the interface with other pieces of legislation and regulation and supports responders to use the Act to support these separate regimes and should be referred to by partners in their resilience activities. Of particular note is statutory and mandatory requirements relating to NHS organisations and responsibilities under Emergency Preparedness, Resilience & Response (EPPR) programme that recognises that some partner organisations are not subject to the CCA but are obligated to respond to community-based incidents under other legislation or commissioning arrangements.

## 4.3 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005

The Regulations provide more detailed information on the specific duties listed in the CCA 2004. In addition, the Regulations provide further information on the implementation of the duties in relation to the geographical areas of Northern Ireland, England & Wales, Scotland and London.

## 4.4 Guidance

Further clarity and context is given to the CCA 2004 and the regulations by a range of guidance documents that are produced by the COBR Unit –Cabinet Office or other UK Government Departments. This handbook has been prepared in line with relevant guidance and in particular, 'Emergency Response and Recovery – Non-Statutory Guidance Accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004' and 'Emergency Preparedness'. A list of guidance documents is shown at 'Table 1'. It should be noted that this table is correct at the time of publication. For an up-to-date position on published guidance, please refer to the CCU in the first instance.

[2] Note that the Act contains additional requirements specific to Scotland and Scottish Ministers.
[3] Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 19, The Fit with Other Legislation 2011

### 4.5 UK Concept of Operations (UK CONOPs)

UK CONOPs outlines the main structures and processes that the UK Government will implement in order to respond to, and recover from, an emergency. In particular, it focuses on the key national structures that could be implemented in the event of a short or no-notice event. UK CONOPs complements the CCA 2004 and for this reason, the local response and recovery arrangements that are put in place by the SRF partnership are deliberately designed to link in to these.

In summary, UK CONOPs outlines the following concepts that would be key to an effective UK response or recovery operation during a major incident:

- The role of Cabinet Office and Lead Government Departments (LGD).
- The role of Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR).
- How UK Government response links into local response and recovery arrangements (in our case through the SRF partnership).
- The role of the Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (RED).

### 4.6 Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)

**CO-LOCATE**

Co-locate with other responders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location.

**COMMUNICATE**

Communicate using language which is clear, and free from technical jargon and abbreviations.

**CO-ORDINATE**

Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead organisation. Identify priorities, resources, capabilities and limitations for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings.

**JOINTLY UNDERSTAND RISK**

Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards, to agree appropriate control measures.

**SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**

Establish shared situational awareness by using M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model.

The SRF partnership has adopted the nationally agreed JESIP Joint Doctrine in full.  In practice, this consists of:

- JESIP principles and joint doctrine being integrated with the SRF partnership's plans, including the Strategic and Tactical Leaders' Guides.
- JESIP being incorporated into the SRF's training competency framework
- Tactical commanders of all agencies being offered JESIP Tactical Commander Training.
- Promotion of JESIP training to other key partners e.g. crowded places.
- All CCU Officers undertaking the JESIP Tactical Commander Training.
- All JESIP trained staff using the Joint Decision Model and METHANE incident reporting model.
- Promotion of JESIP in training delivered to partners, JESIP principles being employed at multi-agency exercises run by the CCU.
- On-going support for additional doctrine and supporting training and exercising as part of the ongoing JESIP initiative.

Further information on JESIP can be found at http://www.jesip.org.uk/.

## Table 1- Guidance Documents for Civil Contingencies

| General overarching CCA |
|---|
| UK Central Government's Concept of Operations (CONOPS) |
| CCA Regulations |
| Emergency Preparedness |
| Emergency Response and Recovery |
| The role of LRFs: A Reference Document |
| Expectations and indicators of good practice set for category 1 and 2 responders |
| National Resilience Standards for Local Resilience Forums |
| JESIP Joint Doctrine |
| UK Government Resilience Framework |

| Before/Preparedness |
|---|
| **Guidance for Preparedness (General)** |
| Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies |
| UK humanitarian framework |
| Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience |
| CPNI Telecommunications Resilience Good Practice Guide |
| Resilient Telecommunications Guidance for NHS England and the NHS in England |
| NHS England Business continuity guidance |
| **Risk** |
| National Security Strategy |
| Protecting Against Terrorism |
| Protective Security – National Protective Security Authority |
| Communicating Risk Guidance |
| National Risk Register (NRR) |
| **BCM** |
| BCI Good Practice Guidelines |
| Business Continuity Management for Fuel Shortages |
| ISO 22301 |
| **Health** |
| NHS England Emergency Preparedness Resilience and Response Framework |
| NHS Emergency preparedness, resilience and response: core standards |
| NHS England Incident Response Plan (National) |
| UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy |
| Preparing for Pandemic Influenza |
| UKHSA Cold weather plan for England |
| UKHSA Heatwave Plan for England |
| Clinical guidelines for major incidents |
| **Planning for Flooding and Water Incidents** |
| Developing a Multi-Agency Flood Plan - Guidance for LRFs |
| Reservoir Inundation Framework |
| Planning for Major Water and Waste Water Incidents in England and Wales |

## During

### Guidance for Responding to Incidents

Evacuation and Shelter Guidance
Evacuation and shelter guidance for the NHS in England
Public Safety in Complex and Built Environments
Understanding Crowd Behaviour: A Guide to for Readers Guidance and Lessons Identified
Preparing for Emergencies: Guide for Communities
Guidance on dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies
NHS Concept of operations for the management of mass casualties
Identifying People who are Vulnerable in a Crisis
The Needs of Faith Communities in Major Emergencies
CCA 2004 Duty to Communicate with the Public: The Ten Step Cycle (Annex 7D to Emergency Preparedness)
Mutual Aid: A Short Guide for Local Authorities
Logistic Operations for Emergency Supplies Guidance for Emergency Planners
Multi Agency Strategic Holding Areas: A guide to the identification inspection and establishment of Strategic Holding Areas
Keeping the Country Running: Natural Hazards and Infrastructure
The control of Major Accidents Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 2015

### CBRN

Strategic National Guidance: The Decontamination of Buildings, Infrastructure and open environment exposed to CBRN Materials (2017)
The release of CBRN substances or material-Guidance for Local Authorities (Home Office 2003)
Strategic National Guidance - Decontamination of people exposed to CBRN substances (2004)
Initial Operational Response to Incidents Suspected to Involve Hazardous Substances or CBRN Materials
UK recovery Handbooks (Radiation Incidents)
UK recovery Handbook (Biological Incidents)
UK recovery Handbook (Chemical Incidents)
Chemical, biological and nuclear incidents: clinical management and health protection (PHE 2018)
Responding to a CBRN(e) event: Joint Operating Principles for the emergency services (2016)
NHS Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) guidance

## After

### Recovery

National Recovery Guidance
Support for Recovery from Exceptional Emergencies-Financial Guidance
Site Clearance Capability Guidance
Guidance on Management and Distribution of Disaster Trust Funds

## Other

### Information Sharing, Co-Operation and Roles and Responsibilities

Operations in the UK-The Defence Contribution to Resilience
Data Protection and Sharing-Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders
The Role of the Insurance Industry in Civil Emergencies
Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme
Bellwin scheme of emergency financial assistance to local authorities: guidance

### Training and Exercising

The Exercise Planners Guide

# 5 Sub-national arrangements for civil contingencies

## 5.1 Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (Resilience and Emergencies Division) DLUHC (RED)

DLUHC Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) is committed to working with and supporting Staffordshire LRF to help improve capability and readiness to respond to and recover from emergencies. RED is the two-way communication link between central government departments and Staffordshire. Support will primarily be provided by two dedicated Resilience Advisers or by a specific RED capability lead (according to expertise and availability).

RED will engage formally with the LRFs through the following meetings:

- Staffordshire Resilience Forum (SRF)
- SRF Tactical Group
- Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG)
- Other sub-groups as agreed/appropriate by exception

RED will provide updates on national risks and other issues including the cross-Whitehall Forward Look and feedback to Central Government Departments.

Outside of meetings, ad-hoc engagement, support and advice will be provided as requested by the LRF or individual partners. This might include:

- Working with the LRF to support agreed resilience objectives as set out in its work programme.
- Working with the LRF to resolve blockages of issues at a local level or wider crosscutting issues that would impact on the capacity or capability of local responders to plan.
- Facilitating the sharing of good practice between LRFs and individual local authorities.
- Directly engaging with local authorities to raise the profile of resilience and preparedness.

RED will also maintain regular contact with the CCU as appropriate.

RED will actively support training, exercises and events that involve a Government Liaison Officer role.

# 6 Local arrangements for civil contingencies: Day-to-day working of the SRF partnership

## 6.1 SRF partnership

The 'SRF partnership' is the term used to describe the mechanism through which routine Civil Contingencies activity is co-ordinated and delivered at a local level in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent. An overview of the SRF partnership's structures for normal daily business is shown at Diagram 1. There are a number of key elements to this partnership approach:

## 6.2 Partner organisations

The SRF partnership consists of the following organisations (see Annexes A, B and C):

- Cat 1 responders
- Cat 2 responders
- NHS organisations not covered by the CCA 2004 but still engaged fully in the SRF partnership (Midlands Partnership Foundation Trust; and North Staffordshire Combined Healthcare Trust)
- DLUHC (RED)
- Military
- Voluntary sector
- Private sector organisations and representative bodies
- CCU

## 6.3 Meetings

As shown in Diagram 2 there are a number of agreed meetings within the SRF partnership:

**i. SRF**

This is a meeting that is a mandatory requirement under the CCA 2004. In accordance with the Act, the SRF meets a minimum of two times per year (currently quarterly) and its primary function is to oversee the risk profile and multi-agency output of the entire SRF partnership. By its very nature, the SRF is intended to attract a strategic audience at Chief Executive or Deputy Chief Executive (or equivalent) level. The meeting is chaired by Staffordshire Police and has agreed Terms of Reference in place.

ii. **SRF Tactical (SRFT) meeting**

This meeting brings together tactical or middle management level representatives from SRF Cat 1 responders to monitor key multi-agency projects, review lessons from incidents, review risks and escalate any matters of a strategic nature to the SRF. The group meets four times a year, is chaired by Staffordshire Police and has agreed terms of reference in place.

**iii. Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG)**

Risk is the golden thread that runs through all SRF partnership's preparedness activities, and plays a significant part in the Tactical process– see SRF Tactical section

The RAWG brings together subject matter experts from the SRF partnership's Cat 1 responders to review and update the SRF's risk and hazard profile. Once complete, the risk profile, known as the

Community Risk Register (CRR), is published on the Staffordshire Prepared website, as it is a mandatory requirement of the CCA 2004 for the document to be publicly available.

In addition, the RAWG produces a Risk Treatment Document that links risks from the CRR to the SRF partnership's multi-agency plans and protocols. For reference, all supporting documents relating to the CRR are held on Resilience Direct. The RAWG meets four times a year, several weeks prior to SRFT and is chaired by the CCU. It too has agreed terms of reference in place.

**iv. Media and Communications Group**

The Media and Communications Group brings together media and communication officers from SRF partner organisations to develop and promote mutual support and co-operation in response between Communications Teams across Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent. The Group meets regularly, is co-chaired by representatives of the emergency services, health and local authorities, supported by CCU and has agreed terms of reference in place.

**v. Voluntary Sector Group**

The Voluntary Sector Group provides a focus for the coordination of voluntary sector support to civil contingencies in the SRF.

**vi. Civil Contingencies Unit Strategic Leaders' Meeting (CCUSLM)**

The CCUSLM brings together representatives of the CCU's funding partners with strategic lead responsibility for Civil Contingencies within their respective organisations. The focus of discussion is around strategic planning for the CCU from a business perspective (i.e. there should be no focus on contingency planning in the meeting) and assurance. The meeting is chaired by the Chief Fire Officer (or nominated Principal Officer) in the role of guarantor of business assurance to the SRF partnership and has an agreed Terms of Reference in place.

**vii. Local Health Resilience Partnership (LHRP)**

The LHRP is a strategic meeting that is a formal requirement under the national NHS Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) arrangements. The meeting brings together representatives from the NHS Organisations in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent to co-ordinate resilience activity such as exercises, training and plan development. The LHRP meets quarterly and is co-chaired by the ICB Accountable Emergency Officer of the Staffordshire and Stoke on Trent ICB and the Local Authority Director of Public Health for Staffordshire.

The work of the LHRP is supported by the Health Emergency Planning Officer Group (HEPOG) from the NHS organisations in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent. This is chaired by the EPRR lead from NHS England.

**viii. Task and finish projects**

Task and Finish projects are the main delivery mechanism for multi-agency planning, training and exercises in the SRF partnership. An outline proposal of project brief for each Task and Finish project is typically raised via the SRFT Meeting for approval. Once agreed, each project is monitored by SRFT and ultimately closed by SRFT or the SRF, depending on the nature of the agreed outcomes.

*Diagram 1- SRF preparedness structure*



# 7 Local Arrangements for Civil Contingencies: Multi-agency incident response and recovery in the SRF partnership

## 7.1 Multi-Agency integrated emergency management [4]

Emergency Preparedness 2012 provides guidance to responders on how to manage their civil protection arrangements and the embedding of integrated emergency management into organisational activity; this handbook outlines how the six activities are embedded into both preparedness and response activities within the SRF.

The following six activities are fundamental to an integrated approach:

- Anticipation
- Assessment
- Prevention
- Preparation
- Response
- Recovery management

## 7.2 Principles

The SRF partnership aligns itself with the principles of major incident response and recovery, as laid out in Emergency Preparedness, as follows:

### 7.2.1 Anticipation

- Maintenance of the Community Risk Register (CRR).
- Horizon-scanning through the risk process, from intelligence provided by local and regional partners by, DLUHC (RED) and CCU networks.
- Open dialogue between Chair of SRF and Director of Civil Contingencies.
- Implementation of Strategic Assessment Meeting (SAM) concept to pre-empt and prepare SRF partnership for emerging risks

### 7.2.2 Preparedness

Demonstrated through:

- Staffordshire Prepared plans, documents and capabilities
- Multi-agency training programme
- Multi-agency exercising schedule
- Single-agency training
- Single-agency plans
- Single-agency exercises

### 7.2.3 Continuity

- Business continuity planning
- Business continuity exercising

[4] Cabinet Office – Chapter 1 Revision to Emergency Preparedness
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61024/Chapter-1-Introduction_amends_16042012.pdf

### 7.2.4 Subsidiarity

- Adoption of the multi-agency Strategic-Tactical-Operational[5] approach to ensure decision-making takes place at the lowest appropriate level and co-ordination takes place at the highest necessary level.

### 7.2.5 Direction

Supported by

- Definition of unifying Mission and supporting Strategic Objectives at strategic level for response.
- Definition of Recovery Objectives at strategic level for recovery.
- Exercising Mission and Strategic Objectives concept at tactical and strategic level exercises.
- Production and review of Strategic Leaders' Guide and accompanying coaching.
- Production and review of Tactical Leaders' Guide and accompanying coaching.

### 7.2.6 Integration

- A common approach to planning and response in both single and multi-agency activity arrangements.
- Co-ordination support provided locally to multi-agency operations by CCU.
- Co-ordination support provided with sub-national and national tiers through DLUHC (RED).

### 7.2.7 Communication

- Resilient Telecommunications plan in place and tested via Exercise MERCURY.
- Multi-agency Media and Communication Group and plan are in place.
- Access to Staffordshire Prepared website and ResilienceDirect via CCU.
- Comprehensive contact lists maintained by the CCU.

### 7.2.8 Co-operation

- Sharing of plans and best practice across the SRF partnership.
- Relationship-building through, attendance at multi-agency meetings, training and exercises etc.
- Mutual aid agreements in place.

[5] This replaces Gold/Silver/Bronze in accordance with JESIP.

# 8 Local multi-agency preparedness process

The SRF has a robust and effective management processes for ensuring that:

- All activity contributes to the LRFs preparedness in achieving compliance with legislation and guidance, and providing assurance on the quality of outputs.
- Plans, guides and capabilities are reviewed in a timely manner as outlined in Chapter 5 of Emergency Preparedness[6]
- The SRF tactical and strategic level meetings are properly briefed on the risk profile of the area.
- Lessons identified from local multi-agency debriefs and JESIP Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) are captured and actioned as appropriate.

## 8.1 Whole SRF activity structure

Diagram 2 sets out in a single image how the LRF's processes flow. In preparedness, the principal process flow is through SRF Tactical up to the main SRF meeting for strategic oversight, direction and sign off.

The response section lists the key documents and plans that will be activated in an emergency and the management of preparedness activity is conducted as follows:

### 8.1.1 Risk assessment process

The SRF Community Risk Register (CRR) has been developed from the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) which is typically issued every two years by the UK Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS). On each new issue, the multi-agency RAWG considers the hundred or so risks listed and assesses the local impact and likelihood of each on our area over the next two years. A few risks such as Coastal Flooding are immediately discounted, the remainder are then assessed by the group and added to the CRR, along with locally identified risks specific to the SRF area.

The RAWG then published the following documents:

- A public facing CRR on the Staffordshire Prepared website: (https://www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk/Preparing-yourself/Staffordshire-Community-Risk-Register-Jun-2021-Public.pdf ) to advise the public on the risks to Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent.
- On ResilienceDirect, all Official Sensitive classified: (https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home/1440/03.-Risk-Management )
    - Individual risk and threat assessments for each NSRA risk assessed.
    - A more detailed CRR for consumption by local Resilience professionals.
    - Risk Treatment document, linking risks to emergency plans that are required to mitigate or respond to such an event.
    - Risk and threat planning assumptions document to support contingency planning.
    - List of discounted risks.

6 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61028/Emergency_Preparedness_chapter5_amends_21112011.pdf

The RAWG meets four times a year and meetings are timed to occur several weeks prior to the next SRF Tactical meeting. In addition to managing the above process, it hears updates from local partners and DLUHC (RED) on emerging or short-term risks such a seasonal weather.

The Chair of the RAWG produces a report for the subsequent SRF Tactical that includes:

- A summary of the LRF's current risk profile.
- A forward look on emerging or short-term risks.
- An update on malicious threats (as briefed by CTU).
- An update on the protest risk as briefed by the Police Tactical Planning Unit (TPU).
- A shortened version of the risk treatment and Risk Planning Assumptions documents.
- Recommendations on any emerging gaps on local response capability arising from the RAWG process.

### 8.1.2 SRF Tactical planning management

The principal vehicle to drive delivery in the SRF area is the multi-agency SRF Tactical (SRFT) meeting that takes place four times a year and are timed to occur a few weeks before the Strategic level SRF.

SRFT considers and actions the following:

- The RAWG report in order to be able to initiate or direct appropriate activities.
- CONTEST update.
- Updates on key current events or issues such as HS2 and Protect & Prepare Board.
- Oversees and manages the Lessons process namely:
    - All multi-agency Debrief reports and JOL action notes are submitted to it in order to agree what actions are required as a result of the lessons identified.
    - Maintain an overview of the LRF Lessons Register, agreeing what can be added and confirming when actions have been completed.
- Initiates new work such a plans or planning activities.
- The 3-year work programme to ensure it is on track and to help enable delivery to take place.
- Training and exercise needs to inform the SRF T&E calendar.
- An update from the multi-agency Communications Group on their activities and to ensure the communication needs of SRF activities are planned.
- Approve draft multi-agency emergency plans and guides that have either been developed and reviewed, and then consulted upon. As the penultimate step to sign off, they are in final draft and have been agreed by stakeholders. Once approved by SRFT these documents are submitted to the next SRF meeting for final sign off.
- Identifies issues and activities that require referral to the next SRF Strategic meeting or require more urgent strategic intervention.

### 8.1.3 The lessons (debrief) process

Identification of, and change as a result of learning identified from incidents is an important element of change and improvement and is recognised across sectors. The SRF maintains a lesson process which facilitates the identification of, and response to lessons from local incidents, from notable national and international incidents and inquiries or reviews, as outlined below. SRF Tactical is the location for the reporting, review, allocation of action and monitoring of process of any lessons identified in the following ways:

- **Local single-agency / other incidents**

  All organisations are encouraged by JESIP to undertake hot and cold debrief processes following notable activity. This will include learning from the activities of local individual agencies or brought through sectors by individual partners for local consideration.

- **Local multi-agency incidents**

  All incidents that trigger a SRF multi-agency response will be subject to a prompt from the CCU for a multi-agency debrief. Where incidents involving multi-agency response have been dealt with and one or more partner considers the need to properly explore and record learning from it, the CCU will coordinate the lesson identification process and seek a senior level sponsor to oversee the process.

  Depending upon the scale of the incident, the debrief process may be via a survey or debrief session(s). The CCU maintains systems for online surveys and holds contact details of multi-agency debriefers trained by the College of Policing. The CCU works on the principal that a debrief team will be appointed who have not been involved in the response in order to maintain independence. The subsequent debrief report prepared by the team will be signed off by the sponsor for referral to SRF Tactical.

- **JESIP Joint Organisational Learning (JOL)**

  JOL Action Notes are available to all responders and are advised to monitor these to identify relevant sector-specific lessons. The Fire Service also maintains a list of JESIP JOL Action Notes and where there is a wider multi-agency dimension they are also included in the process and report to SRF Tactical for consideration.

- **Notable national learning / inquiries**

  In undertaking horizon scanning, the CCU will report any notable reports arising from inquiries, reviews or national guidance.

  The SRF Tactical's response to any lesson identified will be to:
  1) Review lesson against local processes and national guidance and identify those where further action is required.
  2) Record rationale for not taking action on any lessons in the minutes.
  3) Agree action and allocation of activity to relevant organisations / sectors.
  4) Agree timeframe for completion of activity.
  5) Transfer all actions to SRF lesson register (https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home/116715/Lessons-register ) for reporting and monitoring (progress RAG rated).
  6) Communicate actions and timeframes to activity owners and request updates at agreed schedule.
  7) Monitor progress at every SRF Tactical to ensure timely completion.
  8) Archive completed lessons for monitoring process.

### 8.1.4 SRF work plan process

All multi-agency plans and guidance documents are listed on the LRF's ResilienceDirect pages (https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home/1444/07-Plans) and are subject to routine reviews either

- Annually or
- Triennially

The work programme is overseen by SRF Tactical which operates as a de-facto programme board. Completed plans are signed off by the group before being submitted to the main SRF meeting for final approval. Any delays or difficulties experienced are dealt with by SRF Tactical.

### 8.1.5 SRF training and exercise process

The SRF maintains a training and exercise programme which, from 2023, is a competence-based model based on good practice and the UK Resilience Standard requirements. The programme is outlined in the ResilienceDirect SRF Learning Hub and supports both generic knowledge and specific role-based training.

The SRF programme and need of partners is reviewed quarterly by SRF Tactical on the basis of its review of risk, planning and lessons, all of which can inform the multi-agency training and exercise needs.

The SRF meeting seeks assurance annually on the capacity and capability of responders to support a sustained multi-agency response which is evidenced through completion of an annual training needs analysis.

## *Diagram 2: SRF activity structure overview*

See next page.


Staffordshire Resilience Forum activity structure April 2023
Planning
Administration
Response
Strategic oversight
Staffs prepared plans
Generic response: Multi-agency Handbook, Strat & Tact Leaders' Guides, Media & Comms, STAC, Strat Coord Centre, Recovery, Site clearance
Natural: Animal health, Pandemic, Severe Weather, Flooding
Sites: COMAH, Pipeline, Waste sites, Reservoirs
People: Care & welfare, Evac & shelter, Mass fats, Mass displacement
Specialist: CBRNe/HAZMAT, Res Comms, Power Loss, Change to threat level, Op Bridge, Cyber, Fuel
Other: Prisons, Rail
Train, embed & exercise
Training & exercise programme
Training Needs Analysis
SRF training hub & content
5-yr SRF Exercise planner
SRF Assurance
Supports
Information sharing
Lunch & Learn
SRF Conference
RD Blog
Action alerts
SRF Secretariat
Meeting admin
Budget & business administration
Sharing alerts, news & forecasts
Standards
T&E records & admin
GDPR
Comms & media group
Comms liaison
Comms training
Comms conference
Directs
Standards & assurance
Resilience Standards schedule
Peer reviews
Annual T&E statement
Online survey feedback
SRF Assurance
Risk Assessment Working Grp
NSRA review
Risk Register-CRR
Threat register
Capability review
Quarterly R&T horizon scan
Informs
SRF Tactical
Tactical TOR
Risk & threat
Lesson register
Emerging activity
3-yr work plan
T&E activity
SRF referrals
Reports to & directed by
SRF
SRF TOR
Risk & threat
Tactical oversight
Update report
Assurance
Priorities & policy
Reports to & directed by
CCU SLM
SLM TOR
Service Level Agreements
KPIs
Assurance
Directs
CCU Team
Unit Management
Staff management
Staff training
Link Officer
Additional support contracts
Duty Officer role
Action cards
Directs
Additional work streams
EU exit
Waste Fire sites
Regional Mass fats
Liaison
CONTEST; P&P
LHRP
CCNG (Local Auth)
Regional Mass Fats
Resilience Direct
Trent Catchment
Regional Cat 2s
LRF Secretariat
HS2
SAG / Public Events
Informs
Lessons
Lesson policy
Lesson Register
Structured debrief team
Debrief templates
SRF JOL SPOC
Community Resilience
Com Res Strategy
www.Staffordshireprepared.gov.uk
Twitter @Staffsprepared
Engages
Vol Sector
Vol Sector TOR
Vol Sector Strategy
Resources database
TCG Vol Sector Cell
Spontaneous vols
Spont search vols
Response
Multi agency incident handbook
Strategic Leaders' Guide
Tactical Leaders' Guide
Staffs Prepared Plans
Engages
Operational support
Activation
Duty Officer rota
Strategic advisor
TCG Room Manager & Tac Ad
MCU / MAMCP
Equipment
Informs

## 8.2 Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU)

The CCU is a specialist team of contingency planners that support the work of the SRF partnership. The CCU is funded by SRF responder organisations, (most of whom are Cat 1 responders) and it is based at Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Headquarters, Pirehill, Stone, Staffordshire.

The CCU has four main roles:

i. Development, review and storage of the SRF partnership's strategic, multi-agency response and recovery plans and associated guidance documents. The plans are known as 'Staffordshire Prepared Plans'.
ii. Design and delivery of multi-agency training, coaching and exercising.
iii. Provision of 24/7 operational support to SRF partner organisations on request during incidents.
iv. Provision of secretariat support to the main meetings of the SRF partnership.

The CCU also provides at additional charge, support to those partner organisations who wish to have a Civil Contingencies Officer embedded in their organisation part time working on their own internal work plan.

In support of the four main roles the CCU has a number of capabilities to support all levels of responder in the SRF partnership area, both during incidents and during routine, day-to-day contingency planning. Support for non-incident related work is listed below. The Unit's support for incident related work is outlined later in Part 2. An overview of the CCU is provided at Diagram 3 for ease of reference.

These capabilities or assets include:

- Maintenance of the Staffordshire Prepared website.
- Maintenance of the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's Resilience Direct pages which includes agendas and minutes of all multi-agency meetings, copy plans and guides, and emergency response information.
- A Staffordshire Prepared monthly information/ latest news blog maintained on Resilience Direct in order to keep partners appraised of current issues.
- A detailed contact list for key individuals in and out of hours in Category 1, 2 and voluntary sector organisations.
- Physical capabilities such as:
    - A Mobile Command Unit and associated equipment
    - Approximately 440 beds and associated bedding held across four locations spread across the SRF area.
    - Two canvas temporary "pop-up" structures

*Diagram 3 – Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit*



# PART TWO: RESPONSE

***Diagram 4 - Incident activation flowchart***




*Ref: See JESIP/METHANE section 10.1.1

# 9 Activation

The multi-agency response can be activated by any partner following an assessment of potential scale, impact and duration of an immediate or developing situation. Notification should be made following the incident activation flow chart to the 24/7 Duty Officer who will support the partner to review the potential implications of the incident upon responders, the public and community, and support the activation and escalation of response activity. The principals of activation will be guided by the following JESIP considerations but should follow the SRF principle of early activation in order to support a timely and comprehensive multi-agency response.

## 9.1 Integration of JESIP

The SRF multi-agency responses will be in line with JESIP and the models and principles that have become the standard for interoperability in the UK, as outlined in the JESIP Joint Doctrine: The interoperability framework .

JESIP is scalable, so the SRF response will be based on the five joint working principles and models that can be applied to **any type** of multi-agency incident.

The five principles are:

- Co-locate
- Communicate
- Co-ordinate
- Joint understanding of risk and
- Shared situational awareness

### 9.1.1 M/ETHANE report

In order to help all agencies gather initial information about an incident in a consistent manner, a common approach is used.
The METHANE model is an established reporting framework which provides a common structure for responders and their control rooms to share major incident information.

Each responder agency should send a M/ETHANE message to their control room as soon as possible. The first resources to arrive on scene should send the M/ETHANE message so that situational awareness can be established quickly. The information received through multiple M/ETHANE messages will gradually build to support shared situational awareness in those responding to the incident and between control rooms.

**TO NOTE**: Responders will communicate and update METHANE messages to the CCU in order to activate and maintain situational awareness throughout the multi-agency response.

The M/ETHANE structure is an integral part of JESIP:



The relevant response page of RD contains the capability to develop and maintain a M/ETHANE report in the early stages of a response but this will be replaced by Agency Reports and a shared Situation Report as the response develops.

#### 9.1.2 Joint Decision Model (JDM)

It has been agreed that the LRF will seek to use the JESIP JDM for individual and multi-agency incidents and to support the multi-agency discussion in the following structures.


## 10 Definitions: Major incident or emergency

### 10.1 Legal definitions: Emergency and major incident

There is a specific legal definition of emergency listed at Part 1, Section 1 (1) of the CCA 2004. The definition is as follows:

(1a) An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom.
(1b) An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom.
(1c) War or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.

The event or situation in section 1(1) may occur or be **inside** or **outside** the United Kingdom.

For the purposes of sub-section (1a): An event or situation threatens damage to human welfare **only** if it involves causes or may cause:

- Loss of human life
- Human illness or injury
- Homelessness
- Damage to property
- Disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel

- Disruption of an electronic or other system of communication
- Disruption of facilities for transport
- Disruption of services relating to health.

For the purposes of sub-section (1b): An event or situation threatens damage to the environment only if it involves, causes, or may cause:

- Contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radioactive matter
- Disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life.

### 10.2 Major Incident: Definition

A revised definition for the term MAJOR INCIDENT (MI)[7] was adopted in 2016 and is as follows:

*An event or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies.*

Notes on this definition are as follows:

a) 'Emergency responder agencies' describes all Category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.

b) A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security.

c) A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.

d) The severity of consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.

e) The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers. Where LRFs and responders have explored these criteria in the local context and ahead of time, decision makers will be better informed and more confident in making that judgement.

### 10.3 The practical application of a major incident

Local experience has shown that a fear of declaring a major incident sometimes exists, even when the circumstances dictate that one should be declared. A potential consequence of this was highlighted by The Pitt Review: Learning lessons from the 2007 floods[8]. Pitt urged responders to guard against any delay in declaring a major incident and invoking multi-agency response and recovery structures if some or all of the circumstances that constitute one are present (or may be present) in the very near future.

[7] S6.4 of the NHS EPPR Framework breaks this definition down for NHS-funded organisations

[8] The Pitt Review: Learning lessons from the 2007 floods (25 June 2008), Cabinet Office

To assist further SRF partners, a practical definition of a major incident is a circumstance that could typically involve some or all of the following:

- The rescue, treatment and transportation of a large number of casualties.
- The involvement either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people.
- The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media, usually addressed to the Police.
- The need for the deployment and co-ordination of large-scale combined resources of two or more Cat 1 responders.
- The mobilisation and organisation of the Emergency Services and supporting services, e.g. Local Authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness affecting a large number of people.

Perhaps the simplest test of this broader definition is when the impact of a situation is significant in scale, it will make significant demands on local responders and it will involve an exceptional deployment of resources[9].

### 10.4 Declaration of a major incident/activation of multi-agency response

A major incident may be declared by any officer of a Cat 1 responder organisation from one of the Emergency Services, Environment Agency, NHS Trusts/Organisations or Local Authorities. In so doing, there should be clear evidence that some or all of the criteria outlined in the definitions above have been satisfied and that, as a result, the management of the situation is very clearly out of what should routinely be expected within normal day-to-day operations.

**TO NOTE**: It is important to note that a major incident may not engage all responders equally; or require the same level of activity to support the response. However, recognition of the declaration and preparedness to support the multi-agency response is critical to deliver a co-ordinated response. The declaration of a major incident by one organisation and the implications of this must be communicated quickly between partners. The agency/agencies who declare(s) a major incident should ensure this is logged and then communicate with CCU the rationale and implications, in order to disseminate to wider partners.

Furthermore, the activation of a co-ordinated multi-agency response and Staffordshire Prepared plans or processes is not reliant upon the declaration of a major incident. These structures and assets can and should be activated and utilised early and in any situation where multi-agency co-ordination is required.

#### 10.4.1 Multi-agency declaration: Considerations

**i. Rationale (why)**

In deciding to declare a major incident to respond to the developing circumstances, partners may wish to consider the rationale for the decision and this could include issues such as:

- Recognition of the escalated status of partners (e.g. NHS level 4 declaration).
- To support communication of the seriousness of the circumstances; to seek compliance with specific guidance.
- To escalate the incident and its effects to regional or national tiers.
- To recognise the greater multi-agency coordination required to respond to the challenges ahead

[9] HM Government 'Emergency Response and Recovery Non-Statutory Guidance Accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004' 1.3.6.

- To recognise the potential disruption of normal service delivery to focus upon specific groups or critical services
- To support the sharing of resources to manage potential shortages
- To establish additional intelligence and information-sharing activities in order to support a more agile response
- To target resources to specific activities or coordinate activity across wider-than-usual boundaries

**ii. Actions (what and who)**

There is a potential for the declaration of a major incident to be perceived as an objective in its own right rather than to deliver specific outcomes. Therefore, the SCG should seek to identify the actions to be taken as a result of the decision. For example, in response to the issues raised above, these might include an outline of:

- What additional coordination measures may be established
- What new activities are required from multi-agency partners
- Which services will be prioritised/demoted
- How resources will be identified and allocated
- The internal and external communication activities required
- Any requests to regional / national structures

**iii. Context / impact**

The SCG may also need to consider the context of the declaration and the potential impact of the decision in the following ways:

- If it is in step with other similar LRFs / within the regional and national context.
- What positive and negative impacts might occur regarding:
  - Perception of grip on the incident
  - Leadership of events
  - Horizon scanning and anticipation of demand
  - Engagement with regional structures and Government departments

**iv. De-escalation considerations**

In order to plan for incident de-escalation, the SCG will also need to consider the adoption of criteria for review of the decision or for de-escalation from major incident. This should be related to the rationale for declaration and the criteria could include:

- Adopting a review schedule at each SCG or every week/month etc.
- On de-escalation by other partners.
- On the completion of specific tasks / actions.
- When demand for services / resources reduces to a specific level.
- At the meeting of pre-agreed transition points to recovery.

# 11 Concurrent response

The period since 2019 has provided several instances of concurrent response e.g. Covid, adverse weather and EU exit response; winter 2022 weather; waste site incidents and potential power outage. The experience in preparing for, and responding to concurrent events has highlighted the need to consider how additional/new response might be structured when SRF partners are already engaged in a response. In these circumstances the following assumptions should be considered and applied:

a) There are limited additional resources available to deliver a separate multi-agency response; duplication of effort / structure is to be avoided.
b) Existing response structures work well and are based on flexible and well-established relationships that could be exploited in other incidents.
c) The adaptation of traditional strategic, tactical and operational structures, are familiar to partners and are a model around which future additional arrangements could be planned. The SRF has successfully adapted its traditional response structure to unusual circumstances such as Covid response and therefore, adjusting the response structure in the event of a concurrent incident may be appropriate in order to deliver response objectives.
d) Clarity around decision-making accountability is critical in any structures adopted and there will be a need for flexibility by Strategic and Tactical Leaders to work together in coordinating groups to ensure they complement each other and cooperat in the prioritisation of activity.

## 11.1 Agreed arrangements in the event of a concurrent incident

### 11.1.1 Activation and escalation

The CCU should continue to act as the point of contact for activation and escalation of a multi-agency response. On the receipt of any request/notification of a concurrent incident consultation will take place with the Chair of the SRF and Chairs of existing SCGs to assess the need for further strategic co-ordination.

Depending upon the size, scale and nature of the incident, this could be:
a) Request CCU to monitor the situation.
b) Convene a Strategic or Tactical Assessment Meeting to review intelligence and agree action.
c) Refer the incident to an existing SCG/TCG/Tactical Group for management and potential adjustment to response.
d) Establish a specific SCG for the incident following existing procedures and identify a Chair to lead.

The following flowchart outlines the process to be used in the event of a concurrent incident.

***Diagram 5 - Concurrent incident management process***



### 11.1.2 Strategic response

On agreement that an additional SCG is required, the SCG chairs should discuss and make recommendations to the first SCG meeting on the following additional agenda items:

a) How the existing SCGs might manage/reduce their activity to release multi-agency capacity to support the new response.
b) Which group will take the lead on specific areas and how liaison between SCGs will be undertaken.
c) Any potential gaps, or duplication of activity that require discussion.
d) The needs and format of tactical / operational co-ordination.

### 11.1.3 Tactical response

The need for a Tactical Co-ordinating Group will be a decision of the SCG and any TCG's tasking will consider:

a) Consultation with existing tactical group chairs has achieved consensus that in the event on a concurrent incident, these groups would be best placed to expand their remit/focus to undertake concurrent response planning with minimal adaption and this would use existing systems and relationships for the best effect.
b) The traditional role and remit of a TCG as well whether it will add to the effectiveness of the multi-agency response.
c) That if a new TCG is established, adoption as far as practicable of the Terms of Reference and operating model of a TCG as set out in the SRF's Multi-Agency Incident Handbook and the Tactical Leaders' Guide.
d) If there is need to co-ordinate the work of the existing tactical groups as they focus on the specific incident, the tactical groups will operate as sub groups of the new TCG.

### 11.1.4 Operational response

The operational response will be developed to respond to the needs of the incident but will recognise the concurrent operational response established within specific communities or locations. It will be the role of the TCG / tactical groups to maintain oversight of how the operational response needs to accommodate, adapt to, may utilise or be affected by concurrent operational activities.

### 11.1.5 Information sharing

Existing information gathering and sharing systems adopted for existing response should be reviewed in order to reduce or streamline activity and reduce duplication of effort. Resilience Direct will continue to be the method for information sharing.

# 12 Response timeline and structures

## 12.1 Source of incident: bottom up vs top down

A multi-agency response and recovery structure can be initiated by the first organisations to respond to the immediate scene of the incident. This is likely to be the case in a sudden, no-notice event such as a fire, where the situation escalates upwards, with the tactical and strategic multi-agency management tiers being implemented in turn (i.e. 'Bottom Up').

However, it is also possible to invoke the strategic tiers of multi-agency response and recovery first, followed by the Tactical and Operational levels (i.e. 'Top Down'). This is common when dealing with a 'rising tide' incident such as flooding, when it is typical for there to be some degree of lead-in time between becoming aware of the risk and the risk actually coming to fruition.

## 12.2 Phases of response

Response typically is considered to be in the following phases:

- Acute – where responders are working at a raised tempo whilst dealing with the immediate aftermath.
- Stable / consolidated - where structures and working processes have stabilised and bedded in, responders are still very busy.
- Transition to Recovery - Response activity is noticeably reducing and the focus is starting to turn to restoration and clean up (Recovery). Working groups and cells' role is to plan for this transition and therefore recovery is running parallel to response.
- Recovery




An overview of the SRF partnership's main structures for responding to and recovering from a major incident are shown at Diagram 6 . These consist of some or all of the following:

## *Diagram 6- SRF Partnership Structures (Response and Recovery)*



### 12.3 Local Concept of Operations: Structure of response and recovery meetings

All response meetings have the following features:

- Nominated Chair from the lead responder organisation.
- Pre-agreed agenda ideally using the Strategic or Tactical Leaders' Guide as guidance.
- All decisions taken in meetings will be undertaken using the JESIP JDM.
- Decisions, actions and rationale from those meetings are to be properly recorded as follows:
  - In the case of a physical meeting, an audio or video recording will be made and stored for future reference. There will be two loggists, one will capture the decisions, actions and rationale in a suitable log book, the second will accurately copy those decisions and actions (only) into an electronic spreadsheet which can be instantly shared on Resilience Direct and promptly updated with outcomes.
  - In the case of a Teams meeting, it will be video recorded and a loggist will capture the action and decision record in the form of shortened minutes. A second loggist will transfer those actions and decisions onto an electronic spreadsheet which again can be shared instantly on Resilience Direct.
- A CCU Advisor to be present working with and in support of the chair.
- Representatives from affected responder organisations, at the correct management level dependant on the meeting in question.

### 12.4 Pre-incident phase (rising tide incident)

#### 12.4.1 Strategic Assessment Meeting (SAM)

The SAM is a locally developed initiative, resulting from direct experience response where partners have time to plan their response e.g. early notification from Government of potential fuel supply disruption. It is a pre-emptive, precautionary meeting of strategic leaders from SRF partner organisations that can be brought together to informally assess an emerging risk. This allows the SRF partnership to be on the 'front foot' by promoting a range of simple steps in readiness for a risk to potentially escalate.

The SAM is normally brought together and chaired by the lead responder (based on type of risk), supported by the CCU. The meeting follows an agenda template and Terms of Reference that are contained within the Strategic Leaders' Guide (see below), it should normally take about one hour and it should be logged and recorded.

There is no hard-and-fast rule governing how many SAMs may be held; it is entirely up to those attending the meeting to decide on the most appropriate number and frequency of subsequent meetings in keeping with the scenario at hand. However, should the risk continue to escalate such that a formal multi-agency response and recovery structure is activated by the SRF partnership, the SAM should be replaced by a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG).

SAMs have been held by the SRF partnership on a number of occasions since 2008, covering risks such as flooding and industrial action. Based on this experience, it is perhaps worth noting some of the key areas where decisions have routinely been taken by SAMs:

- Choosing a common name for the potential operation to ensure consistency of reference.
- Confirming what the specific triggers are for activating a multi-agency response and recovery structure.
- Identifying risks associated with the potential incident and any preparedness activities to be undertaken.
- Communicating the outcome of the meeting to SRF partners.

- Confirming what Staffordshire Prepared Plans or related protocols would need to be activated if the situation escalates.
- Confirming what will be communicated to responders and the public via media/social media.
- Confirming Lead Responders at the Strategic, Tactical and Operational levels of the operation that may follow if the risk continues to escalate.

### 12.4.2 Tactical Assessment Meeting (TAM)

The TAM is a locally developed initiative, resulting from direct experience of the planning for pre-identified demonstrations in October 2015 and March 2016 and is frequently used when the SRF receives notice of potential risks occurring such as 5-day forecasts of severe weather. It is a pre-emptive, precautionary meeting of tactical leaders from SRF partner organisations that can be brought together to informally assess an emerging operation or risk. This allows the SRF partnership to be on the 'front foot' by promoting pre-planning measures in readiness for an event.

The TAM is normally brought together and chaired by a senior officer from the lead responder organisation and will be supported by the CCU. The meeting follows an agenda template and Terms of Reference that are contained within the Tactical Leaders' Guide (see below), it should normally take about one hour and it should be logged and recorded.

There is no hard-and-fast rule governing how many TAMs may be held; it is entirely up to those attending the meeting to decide on the most appropriate number and frequency of subsequent meetings in order to plan for the scenario at hand. However, should the group's activity identify strategic risks outside the delegated remit of the TAM membership that require senior action or consideration, a SAM (see above) should be convened to escalate issues for attention.

Based on the experience of planning for public demonstrations and other operations, it is perhaps worth noting some of the key areas where decisions could be taken by TAMs:

- Choosing a common name for the potential operation to ensure consistency of reference (if not already agreed).
- Identifying key organisations to be involved in multi-agency planning, their role and responsibilities.
- Confirming what the specific triggers and arrangements are for a multi-agency response and recovery structure.
- Communicating decisions and information to partners to assist their preparedness to pre-planned events.
- Confirming what Staffordshire Prepared Plans or related protocols would need to be activated if the situation escalates.
- Confirming what will be communicated to responders and the public via media/social media.
- Confirming Lead Responders at the Strategic, Tactical and Operational levels of the operation that may follow if the risk continues to escalate.

## 12.5 Incident response structures

### 12.5.1 Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)

- **Membership** - The SCG is the meeting for strategic leaders (Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive or Principal Officer level managers) to co-ordinate a multi-agency response operation. Responders used to refer to the SCG as 'Multi-agency Gold' however, for consistency and to remove any ambiguity, the SRF partnership makes singular reference to the 'SCG', as laid down in the JESIP doctrine.

- **Leadership** - The SCG is usually chaired by the lead responder (depending on the risk). It should not be assumed that the SCG will be chaired by Staffordshire Police as Chair of the SRF and discussions should be held at/or prior to the SCG to mutually agree most appropriate Chair between partners/attendees. For example, Local Authorities have heightened statutory responsibility for flooding under the Flood & Water Management Act 2010 and the Health Sector has primacy over risks such as Pandemic Influenza. The Director of Health and Social Care from Staffordshire County Council chaired the Covid19 SCG from March 2020 to February 2022.

- **Venue** - There are a number of options for venues, and the more favoured option today is to carry out the meeting on MS Teams. For a physical meeting, several suitable locations are suggested in the Strategic Leaders' Guide, however as long as the venue provides some key capabilities and facilities (such as video/teleconference capability and Wi-Fi), others may be selected as appropriate. There are three tested venues for SCGs – these are outlined in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) plan, all offer different resources. The SCG venue will be confirmed on activation by the CCU.

- **Set-up** - As with the SAM, all the key processes and supporting documents for activating, running and following-up an SCG are provided in the Strategic Leaders' Guide. The process should therefore run as follows:
  - Meeting called by Category 1 responder and communicated to the SRF partnership by the CCU. Communication will include date, time and location of meeting and any other necessary supporting information. If on Teams, a link will be sent to invitees.
  - If not on Teams CCU sets up (or assists with setting up) the meeting at the agreed location.
  - Pre-SCG planning meeting takes place, with the aim of planning for the forthcoming SCG, receiving the latest intelligence available and then confirming the SCG Agenda. Likely participants in this meeting would be:
    - The Chair of the SCG and supporting Staff Officer.
    - Civil Contingencies Unit Strategic Adviser and support officer.
    - Nominated Loggist(s).
  - Invited SRF partners arrive.
  - SCG run in accordance with the Strategic Leaders' Guide and supporting Agenda.
  - The CCU will provide a strategic adviser to the SCG Chair in order to support him or her to conduct business as efficiently and effectively as possible.
  - SCG followed-up in accordance with the Strategic Leaders' Guide. Normally, this will involve the meeting being voice recorded, the Chair checking and signing the hand-written Log (see below) and then conducting a post-SCG debrief with the CCU officer present.

- **Focus -** The SCG is primarily concerned with the strategic leadership of a multi-agency operation. Therefore, it should rarely become engaged with the tactical detail of the scenario but should empower the Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) to manage this. To assert and then maintain its strategic focus, the SCG should seek as soon as possible (typically as early as its first meeting) to promulgate Strategic Objectives for the entire operation, together with an Aim or Mission if appropriate. All of this information should then be communicated across the response operation to help define the 'bigger picture' of what the multi-agency partners of the SRF partnership are expected to be working together to achieve.

  An additional consideration for later meetings of the SCG will be identification of the point where response objectives are met and a formal handover to recovery is to be undertaken.

- **Objectives -** The strategic objectives (and mission/aim) may be updated as the situation unfolds and the challenges facing the multi-agency operation evolve. However, there are a number of consistent areas that will inevitably form the focus of the SCG and therefore be reflected in its strategic objectives. These could include:
  - Finance
  - Welfare (public and responders)
  - Communication (public and media)
  - Business Continuity & Sustainability
  - Public Health
  - National/Sub-National support
  - Environment

- **Decision making -** It should also be noted that the SCG's decisions should be based on the *consensus* of those attending; it is not, despite the potential severity of the situation at hand, a *command & control* environment. The rationale for this is grounded in the CCA 2004 and UK CONOPs as the SCG is not a legal entity in itself; the SCG (or the Chair) cannot therefore *compel* SRF partners to carry out specific actions. Actions are however, agreed by mutual consent and then recorded along with the rationale in the multi-agency Log. The SCG should also agree and communicate the frequency of its meetings so that other multi-agency meetings can be scheduled to complement this and required attendees can plan their schedules accordingly.

- **Administration** - As with the SAM, the SCG should be logged and it is advisable for each attendee to keep a personal log from the meeting and retain these for possible future reference and/or scrutiny. It should be expected that the first SCG will take in excess of one hour, in order to allow for a thorough understanding of the situation to be developed and for a mission and strategic objectives to be agreed. Each subsequent meeting should take up to one hour; however, the exact timings will be dictated by the speed of the operation as it unfolds, the complexity of the discussion and the need to provide sufficient time for the TCG to be briefed, meet and carry out any agreed actions. The SCG should give clarity to the TCG chair as to which objectives should be prioritised.

### 12.5.2 Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG)

- **Membership -** The TCG is the planning and briefing mechanism for tactical leaders, typically middle management level, to co-ordinate a multi-agency response operation. Some responders used to refer to the TCG as 'Silver Command' or 'Multi-agency Silver'. However, for consistency of reference and to remove ambiguity, the SRF partnership makes singular reference to the TCG, as laid down in the JESIP Doctrine

- **Establishment -** The TCG can be established in one of two main ways:

  i. 'Top-Down' following a consensus agreement at a SAM, TAM or an SCG on the run-in to an incident where there is a degree of warning. Typically, this will outline the requirement for a TCG, the location where it will be run and which organisation will chair it. An example of this approach is the planning for a no-deal Brexit in 2019, where a TCG was requested by SRF partners and run at the CCU offices.

  ii. 'Bottom-Up' where an event has occurred with little or no warning and a decision is taken by responders as part of the initial/early attendance that multi-agency co-ordination is required. In keeping with JESIP Doctrine, a tactical cell, where co-ordination at the tactical level takes place, may be formed at or near the scene of the incident, but there may well come a point where it is no longer appropriate to maintain this arrangement. A TCG would then be convened at an established facility that provides security, 24-hr access, planning and briefing capability and good communications to enable tactical co-ordination of all wider implications and response to be carried out over a sustained period. This may or may not replace the tactical cell at or near to the incident scene. If an on-scene tactical cell still exists, it is vital that there is good communication between this and the off-site TCG, and that there is common understanding as to the exact role of each and the related command arrangements.

- **Venue** - The primary and secondary locations of a formal TCG (not an on-scene tactical cell) have been identified with details of these locations held by the CCU. The primary facility meets the necessary criteria to provide tactical co-ordination over a sustained period.

- **Set-up** - The activation of a TCG premises is a joint operation between the organisation on whose premises it is located and the CCU. The former will ensure that the facilities are set up, including IT and telephones. The floor plan is established in accordance with a pre-determined initial layout. The CCU will work closely with the host to ensure that the facility is ready for operation by tactical commanders by, for example, bringing all the required guides, plans, logs etc.

- **Leadership -** The Chair of the TCG is flexible and follows the same principles as the SCG, namely that the Police would usually be the most appropriate organisation to chair it during a situation when life and/or property are at significant risk. Beyond this, a consensus decision should be taken by the TCG as to which organisation is most appropriate to act as Chair, given the nature of the scenario, the challenges it presents and how this best fits the specific responsibility, accountability and statutory obligations of the represented SRF partner organisations. The TCG should be recorded and logged, as is the case with the SCG.

- **Focus -** The primary role of the TCG is to oversee the more detailed management of the response operation on the ground, whilst ensuring that the strategic requirements laid down by the SCG are met. The former is predominately discharged by close liaison with Operational level staff actually at the scene of the incident, whilst the latter is more about updating the SCG and translating its Mission and Strategic Objectives into tangible outcomes.

  Perhaps the main characteristic of the TCG, and specifically how it should differ from an SCG, is its tempo of action and activity. The TCG should expect to be more engaged in detailed planning and resolving complex, often conflicting challenges. For this reason, it is entirely reasonable to expect the TCG to be a 'busy' atmosphere, with debate, discussion and decisions being made at speed and often under pressure. It is also likely that a TCG will be active continuously, rather than meeting and disassembling on a regular basis.

- **Organisation** - To manage this effectively will always present a difficult and stressful challenge to the TCG and the Chair, particularly during the early stages of the operation. The most effective way of managing this challenge will be:
  - To assert a regular pattern of TCG briefings, correctly logged and recorded at the 'Bird Table' provided at the TCG (reflecting the frequency of the SCG meetings as far as possible).
  - To produce a plan that supports the Strategic Objectives (and Aim/Mission) laid down by the SCG and where necessary to task specific sub groups to deliver accordingly.
  - To establish and maintain situational awareness and be prepared to produce situation reports as necessary.

The biggest risk that the TCG can run is to be over-reliant on the strategic support provided by the SCG. The TCG should be clear that it is empowered to make tactical decisions based on the information that it has on the situation on the ground and the 'bigger picture' that the SCG has set out in its Strategic Objectives (and Aim/Mission). Frequent recourse to the SCG to arbitrate on specific tactical detail will simply frustrate strategic planning and slow the tempo of operations at the TCG.

To function effectively, the main interface between the TCG and SCG should be around ensuring that the SCG is fully aware of the situation on the ground and the challenges being faced. The SCG should provide the TCG with all the resources it requires to be able to respond in the most effective manner and to be able to sustain this over time.

- **Administration -** The CCU will typically provide two officers; a Tactical Adviser to the Chair and a Room Manager to support multi-agency partners working in the room.

### 12.6 Multi-Agency Information Cell / horizon scanning/ achieving shared situational awareness

A Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC) may be established during complex and/or protracted incidents when the collation of intelligence and information exceeds the normal capability of the TCG and SCG structures. A core function of the multi-agency information cell (MAIC) is to produce Situation Reports and materials to achieve a common operating picture that will inform and support the tactical and strategic co-ordinating groups and other responders.

The multi-agency information cell (MAIC) may come together in either a physical, co-located form, or in a virtual form. It will source, access, analyse, display and disseminate situational information, drawing on information and expertise from many sources rather than a single organisation and make use of a wide range of information such as open data sources or social media.

Closely linked to Horizon Scanning, the SCG and TCG should actively gather intelligence at all stages of a multi-agency response and recovery operation and all SRF partners should be encouraged to share intelligence at all times.

In the absence of a MAIC (or prior to its necessity) the CCU can be tasked to gather specific detailed intelligence on an emerging risk. The information gathered and provided by the CCU gave SRF partners a clear understanding of the ongoing issues (e.g. roads open and closed, and taxi and bus services operating) and promoted further specific contingency planning across the SRF partnership.

### 12.7 Communication and Media Cell (CMC)

There will be an on-going and insatiable requirement to communicate at all levels of a multi-agency response and recovery operation. The Chairs of the SCG, TCG and RCG should all proactively plan to communicate as widely and effectively as possible. To assist in this process, the following should be borne in mind:

- The SRF has an Emergency Media & Communications Plan, permitting the media and communication specialists from the lead responder (depending on the type and nature of the incident) to provide a co-ordination response across multi-agency partners. Upon activation of the Plan, a Multi-Agency Communications Group can be activated to provide specialist media advice (and co-ordination of complex multi-agency messages) in support of the SCG and TCG.
- Communication can be 'internal' (i.e. within an individual SRF partner organisation or across the multi-agency response and recovery operation) or 'external' (i.e. with communities, the media, elected officials).

- Communication milestones (e.g. press conferences, public meetings, briefings) should be reflected in the Battle Rhythm (see above).
- Full use should be made of social media (e.g. Twitter/Facebook) to ensure that all areas of the community and SRF responders are being reached with timely and accurate messages.
- Communication should not be delayed while waiting for a clearer picture to emerge. Delay could well create a false impression that not enough is being done or information is being deliberately withheld.
- From 2023, the CMC may be required to draft emergency alerts within government guidance for approval by the SCG.

### 12.8 Mass Fatalities Co-ordinating Group (MFCG)

The MFCG is an agreed meeting that forms part of the Staffordshire Prepared Mass Fatalities Plan. It will be convened by HM Coroner or the SCG in the event of a Mass Fatalities incident, in order to ensure that detailed planning for the activation and mobilisation of specialist capabilities (such as a Mass Fatalities Mortuary and/or the regional emergency mortuary arrangements is in place. The MFCG will be chaired by the relevant HM Coroner and will be strategic in focus, given the high-profile nature of any Mass Fatalities event, the sensitivities involved and the potential financial implications that will arise. As a result, the MFCG should be convened without delay during any Mass Fatalities incident and it should provide clear and consistent updates to the SCG. For further detailed information on Mass Fatalities planning, please consult the SRF Mass Fatalities Plan.

### 12.9 Tactical response cells

Both the SCG and TCG can choose, and indeed are actively encouraged, to form detailed project groups or 'cells' to focus on developing specific, technically detailed pieces of contingency planning. Given the potential complexity of such planning, it would not be appropriate to discuss it at an SCG meeting or TCG briefing without compromising the quality, scope and duration of wider discussion.

Small cells therefore allow specific work to take place outside and between key meetings or briefings, with updates provided on the delivery of agreed outcomes. Examples of subject areas where cells may be considered include:

- Mass fatalities
- Military operational support
- Operational communications and IT equipment
- Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Areas (MASHA)
- Mass transportation
- Voluntary sector co-ordination
- Evacuation and/or shelter
- Horizon scanning/ intelligence/ information

Some cells may be challenged by numerous and competing tasks with resource implications. Tools for prioritising and monitoring these tasks have been developed by the CCU and are available for use in the Tactical Leaders' Guide.

It is vital that sub-group chairs are given a clear brief as to their role and function and that their Terms of Reference are agreed at the earliest opportunity.

#### 12.9.1 Operational

- **Focus -**The operational level of response is typically at the scene of the incident and is therefore intimately involved with co-ordinating support 'on the ground' during a multi-agency response. The main requirement of any operational structure will be to ensure that the TCG is kept as informed of the situation as much as possible and to communicate the resource and capability requirements of the multi-agency operation at the scene.

Given the rapid tempo of operations and the demand on resources (for example for life-saving operations) it is perhaps more appropriate for the operational level to hold regular update briefings as opposed to formal meetings. With this in mind, the SRF partnership has developed the Multi-agency Mobile Co-ordination Post (MAMCP) concept, which provides a means for key responder organisations to physically co-locate, co-operate and communicate during a major incident. It is not a mandatory requirement that this concept should be employed; however, whatever systems are put in place at the operational level should provide some or all of the following:

- A clear location or series of locations for the Operational level.
- A consistent means of communication and list of agreed means of contact (landline phone, mobile phone, email).
- Name and contact details for a multi-agency incident commander at the operational level.

Operational leadership should typically be provided in the first instance by one of the Emergency Services. However, particularly as the initial crisis phase passes and the widespread risk to life and property reduces, other non-Emergency Service organisations may, by consensus agreement, be better placed to assume leadership on the ground

### 12.10 Additional regional and national response structures

#### 12.10.1 NHS Command, Control and Co-ordination in a Major Incident

The NHS has its own agreed Command & Control structures for responding to, and recovering from, a major incident. For a full overview of the command and control framework within the NHS, please see the NHSE Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) Framework (2015) available on their website at https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/eprr/gf/. A summary of the roles and responsibilities of each type of NHS organisation in a major incident is also listed at Annex A and Annex B.

#### 12.10.2 Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

The STAC is a group of local technical experts from those agencies involved in an emergency response that may provide scientific and technical advice to the SCG, TCG or an individual responder's strategic / tactical commander.

For further detailed information on the activation of STAC refer to the UKHSA WM STAC plan. The STAC function is co-ordinated by UKHSA, who will also act as the conduit to national scientific advice in the form of the **Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)**
A group of scientific and technical experts, which is established at national level to provide a common source of advice and to inform multi-agency commanders of decisions made during the UK Government response to an emergency.

#### 12.10.3 Response Co-ordinating Group – Multi LRF (ResCG)

The ResCG is a co-ordination meeting that can be convened by DLUHC (RED) and run by the Lead Government Department (LGD) on request by the SCG to provide wider support to the SRF partnership during the response phase of a major incident. The meeting would invite representatives from neighbouring LRFs and would be chaired by the LGD.

Participation in the ResCG should be at a strategic level from the SRF partnership, ideally including the Chair of the SCG. It is likely, given the geographical remit of the participants and the on-going pressure of responding within the SRF partnership area, that the meeting will be run remotely via teleconference or video conference.

#### 12.10.4 Recovery Co-ordinating Group – multi LRF (RecCG)

The RecCG is a co-ordination meeting that can be pulled together by DLUHC (RED) on request to provide wider support to the SRF partnership (particularly Staffordshire County Council and Stoke-on-Trent City Council) during the recovery phase of a major incident. The meeting would invite representatives from neighbouring LRFs and would be chaired by DLUHC (RED).

Participation in the RecCG should be at a strategic level from the SRF partnership, ideally including the Chair of the RCG. It is likely, given the geographical remit of the participants and the on-going pressure of recovering within the SRF partnership area that the meeting will be run remotely via teleconference or video conference.

#### 12.10.5 COBR Incident Control

During a major incident, CCS would act as focal point for dissemination of key information such as policy advice, media lines, frequently asked questions, visit requests and SITREP templates through DLUHC (RED) to LRFs, including the SRF partnership.

#### 12.10.6 COBR/Lead Government Department (LGD)

During a major incident, COBR may be invoked to ensure that effective national support is being provided by UK Government to the response and recovery operation taking place at a local level. A LGD is likely to be assigned to the operation and the Ministerial lead from the LGD may also chair COBR. The role of the lead government department is set out in "The Lead Government Department and its role – guidance and best practice" published by Cabinet Office.

It is vital that SRF partners note the following in relation to COBR:

- That unless specific legislation is enacted (e.g. Emergency Powers), responsibility and accountability for response and recovery lie with the SRF partnership, collectively through the SCG and individually as Cat 1 responders.

- That the upward reporting requirements (e.g. SITREPs) from the SCG through DLUHC(RED) to CCS are invariably driven by the schedule for briefing the Prime Minister/Ministerial leads and COBR itself. For this reason, it is important that the SRF partnership ensures, through the SCG, that it meets the prescriptive requirements for reporting up to national level.

### 12.11 Closedown of response phase

#### 12.11.1 Transition planning

The transition from response to recovery should be a planned activity through the relevant multi-agency meeting structures that are established for the response. A precursor to the formal handover to recovery, the multi-agency meeting should take the opportunity at a time following the acute phase, to consider such issues as:

1. What must be achieved in order for response to be considered as at a transition point.
2. Schedule for review of progress in response and potential milestones to be achieved.
3. The delivery of mission and objectives and how this might be best achieved.
4. Achieving agreement for handover criteria with the recovery structure.
5. How legacy issues might be managed and the responsible organisations.
6. Activities required to deliver closure of the response phase.

**12.11.2 Transition from response to recovery:**

Having achieved the formal handover point from response to recovery, as outlined in the SRF Recovery Plan, the response structure should ensure the following activities are considered. The transition from response typically involves six areas of activity as listed below:

1. **Response activities to be adopted as part of business as usual activity**
   Residual activities will need to be undertaken and partners should consider what and how these will be undertaken once an SCG (or TCG) closes down. There should be a full and detailed handover so nothing is lost in the process.

2. **De-escalation of multi-agency response**
   Once the SCG agrees, subject to all issues listed being addressed there should be a properly documented decision and rationale recorded by the SCG.

3. **Handover to recovery**
   As covered earlier in this Handbook, Recovery should be considered at the earliest opportunity to allow colleagues engaged in it to fully understand the impacts of the emergency and to consider options for recovery strategies.

4. **Archiving of information**
   - The SRF's policy is for all response documentation, notes, logs, recording to be archived for 25 years.
   - Similarly, individual organisations will have document retention policies and procedures in place and should adhere to those. Organisations should ensure they are able to satisfy requirements to provide evidence to lesson processes, investigations or inquiries and to aid in future learning and improvement.
   -

5. **Learning and change**
   - The SRF maintains a comprehensive lesson process to ensure that the lessons identified through reviews are incorporated to the future SRF workplan. Following a significant or protracted response, there is an opportunity for the SRF to conduct external independent reviews in order to lead to improvements to processes and strategy.
   - Details relating to the debriefing process available for section 8.1.3.

6. **Re-activation**
   - Partners should consider the risks and uncertainty remain relating to any response and that circumstances could arise requiring future multi-agency response
   - Triggers for reactivation should be agreed prior to close down.
   - If those triggers are met, contact should be made by the requestor to the CCU through the 24/7 Duty Officer function.

How the above issues are to be addressed should be fully documented with the rationale recorded for future reference.

# 13 Recovery phase

## 13.1 Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) & Sub-Groups

Recovery planning is potentially the most complex and resource-intensive requirement of any major incident. For this reason, recovery planning should ideally commence at the same time as any multi-agency response operation starting, or as soon as possible after a multi-agency response has started. If the nature of the risk permits the establishment and running of a SAM, how recovery is to be tackled could be discussed and agreed prior to any response actually starting.

The main element of any multi-agency recovery operation in the SRF partnership area is based on a specific plan, known as the Staffordshire Prepared Recovery Plan. This Plan outlines in detail how a recovery operation should be structured, principally around a strategic element (the RCG) supported by a range of tactical Sub-Groups covering specific issues such as Environment & Infrastructure, Health & Wellbeing and Finance & Legal. A Local Authority will lead the recovery process. This will usually be Stoke-on-Trent City Council or Staffordshire County Council, but may be a District or Borough Local Authority if the scale of the incident warrants this. The decision as to which authority will take the lead will be made at the SCG as soon as possible after the start of the incident. Further information is outlined in the Staffordshire Prepared Recovery Plan.

Other SRF partners will be requested to support the RCG and its sub-groups to provide specialist advice and subject matter expertise. SRF partners should be aware that this could well place additional pressure on their time both in the early stages of the recovery operation and beyond, particularly as one of the defining characteristics of recovery is that it can take months, and in some cases years, to conclude. During the response phase, the RCG and Sub-Groups 'shadow' the Strategic, Tactical and Operational multi-agency structures and prepare for a formal hand-over of primacy once the response phase concludes.

### 13.1.1 Handover

As part of its work, the SCG should review whether the multi-agency response to date still merits continuing to run a co-ordinated multi-agency response operation. Guidance on planning for recovery during the response phase is covered in the previous section. There will inevitably come a time when, by consensus, all SRF partners engaged in the response effort will agree that any residual and on-going activity can either be taken up as part of normal daily business or handed over to the recovery operation, which may have been running concurrently.

Planning for handover to recovery should be undertaken early and the Chair of the SCG should discuss the intention to draw the response phase to a close with the Chair of the RCG. This discussion should outline the work done by the response structure to date, detail any outstanding tasks and how these are to be actioned and finally, the SCG Chair's reasons for seeking to end the response phase. The decision needs to be mutually supported and agreed by both the SCG and RCG.

Once agreed between the groups, the response phase will formally end and the recovery phase proper will begin. The process outlined above, including provision for formal documentation of the SCG and RCG Chairs' signature, are included in the Strategic Leaders' Guide.

### 13.1.2 RCG and Sub-groups

Following the handover from response to recovery, the RCG and supporting Subgroups will assume primacy for the ongoing management of the recovery process in accordance with the Staffordshire Prepared Recovery Plan.

# 14 Information management / systems

The SRF has adopted ResilienceDirect as a secure way to share all relevant information.

## 14.1 Resilience Direct (RD) pages

All agencies are required to ensure they have trained personnel at all levels of response who are able to access the SRF's response pages as information such as M/ETHANE reports, action logs, minutes of meetings, agency reports and multi-agency situation reports will be available to them.




Responders will need to monitor the frequently changing pages and content, as notifications of updated content may not be emailed to agencies.

On the establishment of a multi-agency response to an incident, the CCU will establish a unique "response page", a shared operating location on RD, to gather and store incident-related information in one place.

The response page uses a standard layout from RD that will be tailored to fit the incident's circumstances as these develop.

### 14.1.1 Agency reports

Agency reports need to be submitted via RD at agreed intervals to provide information on each agencies' preparedness, response priorities, emerging issues and concerns for wider consideration.

Agency reports form the basis of a collated situation report and therefore, each responder agency is required to ensure it can submit agency reports in the agreed format to the specified schedule.

Agency reports can be developed and stored in draft format for sharing within an organisation prior to formal submission to the multi-agency setting.  All reports are stored on RD and these provide an opportunity to take a historical review of the development of the content and response.

### 14.1.2 Situation reports (SITREPs)

SITREPs are required for completion by the SRF partnership during a response.  SITREPs are normally developed by the TCG Room Manager and Tactical Adviser or, if established, a Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC) based on an RD template that is defined by DLUHC (RED) and the Lead Government Department.  TCG SITREPs are provided to the SCG to inform shared situational awareness.

SITREPs are important as they provide a snapshot of the incident response to achieve shared situational awareness across agencies, highlighting issues for the attention of the TCG or SCG based upon the information submitted in individual Agency Reports.  However, SCG SITREPs are also used to inform key national briefings such as COBR and help in establishing the need for wider support to the local level from UK Government.  DLUHC (RED) will normally be the focal point for SITREP dissemination, both in terms of the format of the document and the required timing for returns.

The CCU will normally act on behalf of the Chair of the SCG in co-ordinating a complete and timely response to the SITREP request by COBR or DLUHC (RED). Failing to send SITREPs or consistently sending incomplete returns to Government is likely to create a negative impression of the SRF partnership and its management of an incident.

### 14.1.3 Common Recognised Information Picture (CRIP)

A CRIP is a single, authoritative strategic overview of an emergency or crisis that is developed according to a standard template and is intended for briefing and decision-support purposes. The CRIP is typically prepared by the MAIC using information taken from the Agency Reports and SCG Situation Report and capability to produce CRIPs is being developed within the SRF.

It will consist of information relating both to the scene and significant wider impacts, including facts and figures, the main developments and decisions, trends and upcoming decision points. The CRIP enables senior officers to be briefed on the latest developments, including significant wider impacts and the progress and challenges of the response.

The CRIP will be stored on, and shared with responders via ResilienceDirect.

### 14.1.4 RD mapping/maps

Maps can provide some of the most useful situational awareness and planning information to SRF partners during an incident and extensive use of maps is strongly advised at all levels of multi-agency response and recovery. GIS support may be requested to be present in the TCG venue, so that electronic mapping via RD Maps is available to inform the co-ordinated multi-agency response. The CCU will seek to provide support to RD mapping activity if resources permit; will request support GIS/mapping leads to support the response and will seek to source hard copy maps for use during the incident response. However, it is strongly recommended that all organisation and responders familiarise themselves with RD mapping and identify RD mapping support staff to assist them during a response.

There is a nationally agreed set of dedicated Civil Contingencies Map Symbology that is produced by CCS. Copies of the symbols are available via the CCU and they can also be referenced in the supporting information that is included in the Tactical Leaders' Guide. Most importantly, the Common Map Symbology is now available for use in the GIS applications provided by Staffordshire County Council and also Resilience Direct in support of the TCG. This allows incident maps to be created, adapted, shared and consistently marked for use by the TCG.




### 14.1.5 Record keeping

- **Log**

  Visible and easily updated logs of actions made in meetings are an important method of maintaining situational awareness and overseeing progress of agreed actions. Decisions/actions and rationale will be recorded by a Loggist as a formal written record of the SAM, TAM, SCG or TCG. Additionally, actions and decisions will be duplicated by a second Loggist on an electronic action log that will be maintained by a CCU officer.

The written/typed log is the definitive record of decisions, actions and rationale of the meeting and will be signed by the Chair as soon as reasonably possible following the closure of the meeting. The written log may be kept in a log book or as a type-written document and the choice of format will be decided in consultation with the Chair to recognise the meeting format eg. In fully virtual meeting, it may be more appropriate to select a type-written format. The same logbook and action log will be used for subsequent meetings with the consecutive action numbers being continued.

The electronic action logs (which should be a verbatim copy of the wording of the written log will record:
- Agreed action or decision
- Action owner
- Schedule for delivery
- Progress made on delivery

Whenever possible, the electronic log will be displayed on a large screen visible to meeting attendees and after the meeting will be promptly saved (as an unedited version) to Resilience Direct so that partner agencies can view a list of actions and decisions. The updating of the master version will be the responsibility of the Loggist and CCU room manager as and when action owners report updates. Those updates should be reported promptly and it should not be left until the next meeting to provide progress updates. For subsequent meetings of the group, the same electronic log will be updated and published in the usual way.

- **Room based information boards**

  Within the physical TCG and in Cell rooms dry-wipe incident boards can be used to facilitate responders to record and update key information including:
  - Name of SCG Chair
  - Name of TCG Chair
  - Mission
  - Strategic objectives
  - Tasks for TCG
  - Battle rhythm
  - Contact information of organisational points of contact

  Completing the Boards should assist in providing a clear understanding at a glance of the current situation, providing consistency of multi-agency requirements across the response and recovery operation and supporting the handover process for staff coming to the operation for the first time or taking over as part of an incoming shift.

  It is advised that boards are photographed regularly by those maintaining the boards and prior to cleaning in order to provide a record of the information available to the response.

  ResilienceDirect has logging function in its response pages which provides a secure capability for partners.

- **Audio or video recordings**

  Whenever possible the CCU will arrange for every SCG, SAM, TCG and TAM to be video (MS Teams) or audio recorded and the audio file will be saved on the relevant response page on Resilience Direct. This is done in lieu of minutes and a recording is considered the most efficient way to record proceedings, particularly when discussions are not directly related to decisions and actions.

- **Personal logs**

  In addition to the written and audio log, all meeting attendees are encouraged to keep their own personal log of their decisions, actions and rationale and to retain the information in the same way as the logbook.

- **Storage and retention of Logs**

  Good practice is for completed logbooks to be stored securely for at least thirty[10] years following the closure of the incident response and recovery operations. Often public enquiries and post incident litigation can take place several years after the incident and it is vital that Chairs of meetings continue to have access to important records. The SRF policy is to therefore to store multi-agency documents / multi-agency logs in a secure way, but partners should also make arrangements to store their own materials.

# 15 Components of response (outputs, elements of)[11]

## 15.1 Battle rhythm

The Battle Rhythm is a daily cycle that establishes an orderly sequence of key events such as meetings, briefings and reports. An effective battle rhythm should address, and where possible avoid, scheduling conflicts in order to allow leadership to be exercised at all levels.

A Battle Rhythm is a critical component in any multi-agency response and recovery operation and as such, it is vital that it is defined by the SCG and communicated to the entire multi-agency structure and DLUHC (RED) without delay. A Battle Rhythm can help in highlighting some or all of the following:

- A scheduling conflict between two or more meetings at the same time.
- Deadlines for critical reports to be sent (e.g. SITREPs).
- Deadlines for collection and collation of data from SRF partners to be allow for critical reports to be produced (e.g. SITREPs).
- Deadlines for key events (e.g. Press Conference).
- Ensuring sufficient time for the TCG to finish meeting before it is then required to update the SCG.
- The most logical and practical time for a shift change to take place.
- Ensuring sufficient travel time to a meeting, indicating that either a Deputy should be sent or remote access should be sought (e.g. Teleconference).
- Opportunity to deconflict meetings across the region to support partners working across a wider geographical area than one LRF.

The main benefits of having and maintaining a battle rhythm are:

- It promotes a seamless flow of communication and reporting (e.g. TCG meets then briefs SCG).

[10] Consistent with s8.9 of NHS EPRR Framework 2022 which gives NHS organisations further guidance
[11] A Glossary of Terms (combining the national Civil Contingencies Lexicon with SRF-specific terms) is available to responders via the Staffordshire Prepared website.

- It promotes ease of handover between responders.
- It allows staff at all levels to plan ahead and limit shocks and surprises.
- It can improve the morale of all staff engaged in the operation when a sensible sequencing of events is put in place.
- The SCG and TCG are able to respond to changes in reporting requirements/meetings with a minimum of fuss.
- Confidence is built in the response and recovery approach being taken, as few if any deadlines are missed.
- Key staff may be sustained for longer and allow them to have a degree of focus on their 'day jobs' by allocating tasks more equitably (e.g. to Deputies).

In planning the Battle Rhythm, it is advisable to sketch it on a timeline diagram. This will then allow some of the key events that would typically form part of any Battle Rhythm to be moved in order to create a more appropriate sequence or 'flow'. Many of the key tasks on the Battle Rhythm will be SRF partnership-specific and so will be able to be moved in this way; however, it should be noted that key events outside the SRF partnership area, particularly those driven by a Ministerial requirement (e.g. SITREPs, COBR) will be fixed and it will not therefore be possible to move them.

### 15.2 Bird table

This is an approach to briefing that is designed to be used in high-pressure, fast-moving scenarios (most notably the TCG) where there is limited scope for protracted discussion and debate. A 'Bird Table' consists of a central table containing useful reference material (e.g. maps, photographs, plans), a 'Chair' at the head of the table and presenters/ participants around the edge; it is important to note that all those present at the 'Bird Table' stand throughout the briefing.

A 'Bird Table' briefing itself typically takes the form of a quick update from each organisation present, followed by a brief summary of any agreed actions. The tempo of the briefing is therefore necessarily brisk as this allows key factual information to be imparted without unduly impacting on the execution of operations on the ground.

When a 'Bird Table' is used at a TCG, one person from each organisation and/or cell should attend the 'Bird Table' briefing to represent their organisation and/or their area of specialism (e.g. media and communications). All remaining staff should continue to manage the on-going co-ordination of the response effort at their working area, away from the 'Bird Table' itself (i.e. response does not cease during the 'Bird Table' briefing).

At the scene of an incident the MAMCP facility provides space in the central inflatable structure for a 'Bird Table' briefing to be held at the operational level. It should perhaps also be noted that the Military are extremely skilled at, and comfortable with, the 'Bird Table' approach.

### 15.3 Horizon scanning

This refers to the process of proactively looking ahead to assess the likely challenges that might face an existing multi-agency response and recovery operation in the near future. It involves tasking a small cell, perhaps as few as two people, to constantly unpick the potential issues that the SCG or TCG might face in a given range of time windows (e.g. 12 hours, 24 hours, 48 hours). This allows the Chair of the SCG and TCG and their supporting planners to understand some or all of the following:

- Potential outcomes of an agreed plan.
- Newly emerging factors that might impact on an agreed plan or require new plans to be made.
- Entirely new risks that might be emerging.

- Requirement to move pre-emptively to deploy (or re-deploy) resources based on a known or developing medium-term risk.

Horizon scanning should start as soon as a multi-agency response and recovery operation starts and it should be maintained and actively supported throughout. Moreover, all SRF partners should be made aware of the Cell's existence and its roles and responsibilities so that information can be provided to them when it emerges.

Within the Cell itself, staff should develop an active communication channel with as wide a cross-section of organisations as possible, including DLUHC(RED), who will have access to Horizon Scanning through CCS and LGDs.

### 15.4 Shift system

In order to sustain effective operations at a high tempo for an extended period, perhaps running into days and sometimes weeks for response alone, a regular rotation of staff will be vital. A shift-system is therefore a crucial consideration for the SCG and particularly the TCG Chairs as soon as any multi-agency operation commences.

A typical shift system consists of three eight-hour shifts in each 24-hour period; however, this should not be taken too prescriptively as the exact circumstances on the ground may well affect this (e.g. there may be a genuine shortage of staff or there may not be a requirement to run constantly through an entire 24-hour period).

Whatever shift system is chosen, the following factors should be borne in mind by the Chair of the SCG and TCG:

- Staff may be reluctant to 'let go' at the end of their shift and may want to stay longer, particularly early on in any operation. Allowing this to happen, commendable though it no doubt is, will potentially restrict valuable rest time and ultimately degrade individual and collective performance over time.
- The shift pattern should be clearly communicated across all SRF partners so that there is consistency of understanding.
- Each shift-change must be accompanied by a handover-takeover (HOTO) between incoming and outgoing staff so that continuity of approach can be maintained.
- Accounting for time allocated to HOTO activity before and after the official shift period, thus extending the period of attendance by personnel.
- It may be prudent to consider staggering shift changes so that there is not a sudden exodus of staff with up-to-date, detailed knowledge of the multi-agency operation.
- Some roles may attract shorter recommended shifts, such as the Loggist role.

### 15.5 Responder welfare

All personnel responsible for staff resources, but particularly SCG and TCG chairs and Forward Control Officers, should consider the welfare needs of themselves and the people working with and for them in the response. In particular they should ensure:

- Sufficient breaks are allowed
- Staff do not work excessive hours (and consideration is given to time spent on hand over and travel to and from deployed locations).
- A shift system is implemented to ensure that adequate cover is maintained at the same time as staff fatigue is minimised.
- Adequate time for hand overs at the beginning and end of shifts is allowed
- Covid safe issues are considered

- Trauma Risk Management (TRiM), defusing or other support opportunities are made available as many staff members are not used to working in such an environment.

### 15.6 Cost-tracking

A major incident may require a significant, unplanned financial outlay by individual SRF responders and the collective partnership through the SCG. It is vital to ensure full accountability for financial commitments from the outset of any incident, with formal responsibility for managing this process being allocated to a lead financial expert (Director level) from an SRF partner organisation via the SCG.

It is prudent to work on a baseline assumption that ‘costs lie where they fall’; however, UK Government may look to offer financial support in certain circumstances, often known as a “Bellwin scheme”[12]. A Bellwin scheme may be activated where an emergency or disaster involving destruction of or danger to life or property occurs and, as a result, one or more local authorities (includes a police authority or combined fire authority) incur expenditure on, or in connection with, the taking of immediate action to safeguard life or property, or to prevent suffering or severe inconvenience, in their area or among its inhabitants.

If such an initiative were invoked, a full breakdown of the financial commitment to date would be required in order to support a ‘bid’ for support. It is far easier to complete this process accurately and in time if cost tracking is already in place. Regardless of whether UK Government assistance is offered, an audited financial record should be included in the Post-Incident Report.

### 15.7 Business continuity

All Cat 1 responders of the SRF partnership have a legal duty under the CCA 2004 to have a workable, tested/exercised and validated Business Continuity Plan (BCP) in place. In reality, a far broader cross-section of SRF partners (e.g. Cat 2 responders, CCU, Military) also has BCPs in place.

Given the enhanced operational footing that BCPs will encourage, it is advisable for the Chair of the SRF to request that all SRF partners participating in a multi-agency response and recovery operation consider activating their BCPs without delay.

### 15.8 Visits/co-ordination

It is entirely reasonable to expect that senior politicians (up to Ministerial level) and VIPs may wish to visit Staffordshire during an incident. The SRF partnership should be prepared at all levels for such an eventuality. Although it will doubtless consume additional resources, such visits are vital for one or all of the following reasons:

- Raising morale of responders and communities.
- Recognising the work of responders and communities.
- Understanding key challenges being faced by the SRF partnership (this could help to influence and/or inform wider policy e.g. at UK Government level).

Given the high-profile nature of any formal visit, it is vital that each is planned in detail. The following SRF partners can assist with visit planning:

- Staffordshire Police (VIP/Royal visits)
- DLUHC (RED) (Ministerial visits)

[12] Bellwin scheme guidance and support available from DLUHC

- CCU (co-ordination across SRF partners)

### 15.9 Security clearance

In a scenario concerning terrorism and/or critical national infrastructure and hazardous sites, it is highly likely that sensitive information may be handled and discussed at a multi-agency response or recovery meeting. As a result, a range of SRF partners already have staff that are security cleared to work routinely with such material.

During any circumstance when sensitive information is to be discussed, the Chair of a multi-agency response or recovery meeting should confirm security clearance requirements. The Strategic Leaders' Guide prompts the Chair of the SCG to do this as a matter of course.

It is advisable for all Category 1 and 2 responders to have at least two or three people security cleared in advance in order to minimise disruption if classified information has to be shared.

The process of vetting is owned by a Government agency, UK Security Vetting (UKSV).

As different agencies interface with Government, CTU and the Security Services in different way and at different levels, there isn't a single policy for all Cat 1 responders. For example, some Local Authorities interface with CPNI directly at the executive level. Category 1 and 2 responders are advised to regularly review their own vetting position with reference to the guidance National security vetting: clearance levels is on the Gov.uk website.

- **Extraordinary confidentiality agreement**
  Where sensitive information is likely to be shared in a multi-agency TCG or SCG, non-security cleared colleagues are likely to be asked to sign a confidentiality agreement beforehand which will be managed by Staffordshire Police in the first instance. This is to permit engagement in response of those non-cleared personnel.

  In these circumstances there is the potential for an SCG or TCG to maintain a higher security clearance log /notes which are only produced by and for cleared personnel.

## 15.10 Critical infrastructure and risk

### 15.10.1 CNI and CTSAs

The SRF partnership area contains a number of hazardous and vulnerable sites, locations that could have a significant impact on local or national infrastructure and/or the maintenance of national security.

Examples of such sites include:

- Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) sites
- Electrical sub-stations
- Gas sub-stations
- Telephone exchanges
- Water treatment works
- Sewage treatment works
- Oil pipelines
- Sites storing hazardous materials
- Police stations
- Waste storage/processing sites
- Fire stations
- Hospitals
- Ambulance holding areas
- Prisons
- Road and rail links
- Bridges

Extensive data on hazardous and vulnerable sites is held by Staffordshire Police Counter-Terrorist Security Advisers (CTSAs) and their advice and guidance on such locations should be sought as soon as possible if they are affected, or likely to be affected, by a major incident.

## 15.11 Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area (MASHA)

During a major incident, it is likely that a range of additional resources and capabilities may need to be brought into the SRF partnership area to provide additional support to the multi-agency response and recovery effort. Examples of such support include heavy plant and specialist Fire & Rescue Service vehicles.

In order to ensure that additional resources can be received and deployed to areas of greatest need with a minimum of delay, one or more MASHAs can be established. Detailed guidance on the establishment and running of a MASHA is published nationally.

Typically, the requirements for such a site include:

- Good access by road
- Good levels of perimeter and site security
- Extensive parking and marshalling space
- Good communications infrastructure
- Access to utilities
- Access to accommodation/space for additional temporary accommodation to be deployed

A view of a Fire & Rescue Service SHA, established in support of the response to the Jan/Feb 2014 Floods in Somerset/Thames Valley

A number of potential sites would meet some or all of the criteria above in the SRF partnership area. To allow detailed planning to be put in place during a major incident, it is strongly advised that a cell be established as soon as possible so that resources can be received at a MASHA within hours if required. Members of this cell should include, as a minimum, Staffordshire Police, Staffordshire Fire & Rescue Service and WMAS.

It should be noted that individual organisations might choose to establish their own site for marshalling resources. This single-agency approach is often referred to as a Strategic Holding Area or SHA.

**15.12 Cordons**

Cordons should be put in place as soon as possible following consultation with the commanders of other emergency services. The Fire and Rescue Service silver commander is able to advise on the extent of the cordons relative to hazards and health and safety.

The purpose of a cordon is to:

- assist in protecting the scene, the public and those working at the scene
- control unauthorised access
- prevent unauthorised interference with the scene
- facilitate emergency services operations
- Ensure the integrity of the scene is maintained for any investigation.

Cordon distances and staff requirements for specific locations or high-risk areas may be determined in advance and incorporated into plans. These may be adjusted depending on the event. Personnel deployed on cordons must be briefed on their role and ongoing developments.

Resources from other agencies and private contractors can be used to provide cordoning services to police forces. Private contractors have no statutory authority and they have to rely on a police officer (or police community support officer (PCSO) at a terrorist-related incident) to exercise any powers.

In the event of other agencies or private contractors being deployed, a risk assessment of the scene must be conducted and the information regarding cordon management requirements should be given to the force incident manager (FIM) and contractor/agency.

A typical cordon, established during an incident in Stoke-on-Trent

- **Inner cordon -**The inner cordon encloses the scene of an incident and contains any area of hazard or contamination. During the rescue phase, the fire and rescue service working in cooperation with medical personnel may be responsible for the inner cordon area.

  Red-and-white tape designates the inner cordon. The size of the inner cordon is determined by the incident.

  Details of all personnel entering and exiting an inner cordon must be recorded for forensic reasons and to ensure that everyone can be accounted for in the event of an evacuation.

  When the rescue phase is complete, the police have responsibility for the area enclosed within an inner cordon in order to:
  - Recover the deceased and human remains
  - Carry out forensic examination of the scene
  - Collect evidence on behalf of a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) or Senior Identification Manager (SIM).

- **Outer cordon -** The outer cordon creates a safe working area for the emergency services and responding agencies. The radius of the cordoned area depends on the type and scope of the incident, the availability of resources and the needs of the community. The tactical commander determines this in consultation with other emergency services.

  An outer cordon is designated by blue-and-white tape, preferably clearly marked with the word police. The scene access control point and exit point must be staffed. Staff must be made aware of who, in addition to the emergency services and other specialist and support personnel, will be arriving. People seeking access must be questioned about their identity and why they require access. Within an outer cordon, the use of blue lights may be used by ambulances collecting or conveying patients, and designated command vehicles. They may be used by other emergency services to facilitate safe passage.

Personnel staffing the outer cordon must be alert to the possibility of people trying to gain unauthorised access, particularly through more remote sections of the boundary. Briefings should clearly identify who is permitted through which cordons and rendezvous points such as the family and friends reception centre and survivor reception centre.

In certain circumstances, other agencies' personnel may require urgent access and, therefore, a police escort. For example:

- other investigating bodies such as the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) or Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) inspectors
- structural engineers
- local authority building control surveyors
- authorised voluntary sector workers.

To assist with managing the media, a media briefing centre should be set up and regular briefings arranged. The nominated media spokesperson should talk for all the agencies and deliver messages agreed by the SCG.

- **Traffic cordon -** A traffic cordon needs to be established to restrict vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.
  Diversions should be used to divert all non-essential traffic from roads leading to or from the incident to prevent congestion and secure free passage of emergency traffic around the scene. Wherever possible, a one-way system with defined access and exit routes should be implemented. Emergency routes to and from designated hospitals should be determined in advance.

### 15.12.1 Legal issues regarding cordons

Statutory provisions that allow the police to impose and enforce a cordon are contained in the Terrorism Act 2000:

- Section 33 defines a cordoned area
- Section 34 gives the power to designate a cordoned area
- Section 35 explains the duration of a cordon
- Section 36 defines the police powers in respect of enforcement of a cordoned area by a constable in uniform.

Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are authorised to enforce a cordon under the Terrorism Act 2000 as one of their standard powers if designated by their chief constable. This power is only applicable in their own force area. In non-terrorism cases, the authority for the police to set up and regulate a cordon is governed by common law (PCSOs have no power under common law). The police are justified in cordoning off an area for the following reasons:

- Where expedient for the purpose of terrorist investigation (ie suspicious device or investigation)
- Authorised by an appropriate officer who is of least the rank of Superintendent, unless a constable, not of that rank, considers it necessary by reason of urgency.

Any person failing to comply with the directions of a police officer deployed to enforce a cordon may be committing an offence under Section 36 of the Act.

Where a cordon is in place for non-terrorism related purposes, section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996, namely resisting or wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of their duty, may be considered by the Police. The powers of arrest under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 apply where appropriate.

Firefighters also have some legal powers under section 44 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 that may be useful in an emergency or major incident.

### 15.13 SRF response documents

#### 15.13.1 Plans and guides

The SRF partnership has a range of plans and guidance documents that are designed to be activated in the event of an incident, or when specific risks or threats have, or may be about to, come to fruition. Access to specific Plans and Protocols can be gained via the CCU or the SRF's Resilience Direct area. The main strategic, multi-agency, risk-based plans are known as 'Staffordshire Prepared Plans'.

#### 15.13.2 Strategic and Tactical Leaders' Guide

This is a user-friendly, checklist-based aide memoire that is issued to all Strategic and Tactical Leaders of the SRF partnership.




The Strategic and Tactical Leaders' Guide have the following main characteristics:

- A checklist approach to the main multi-agency meetings (SAM, SCG, TAM, TCG, RCG), ensuring that maximum consistency of approach is promoted across the SRF partnership.
- Contains all supporting Terms of Reference to limit the administrative burden in a fast-moving scenario.
- Contains a flowchart-based aide memoire for supporting multi-agency response in the very early stages of a major incident.
- It contains additional reference material such as a guide to requesting support from the Military during a major incident, along with other meeting, organisational and personal tools and templates.
- Flexible so that it can be applied to a wide range of scenarios.
- Portable in a sturdy A5 folder.
- Version-controlled by the CCU to ensure as far as possible that all Guides are updated to the same standard.
- Reviewed regularly by the CCU to ensure that any lessons identified from exercises or real-time incident responses are incorporated into the Guide.
- Designed to complement Staffordshire Prepared Plans.
- Supported by a training and coaching programme for decision-makers and it is used extensively during the SRF exercise programme.

#### 15.13.3 SRF information databases

The CCU maintains a number of databases on behalf of the SRF to support the partnership's preparedness and response capability. These include:

- Resources and equipment database
- Multi-Agency Loggists

- COP Debriefers
- Email distribution lists
- Emergency contact/action list
- Voluntary sector contact list

#### 15.13.4 Partner – held data

Many partner organisations such as healthcare partners, local authorities and utility providers hold lists of vulnerable people that can be accessed in an emergency. Further guidance on the management, sharing, retention and disposal of data is being developed to support partners in this activity. The CCU can enable contact to be made with database owners in order to support planning and response which, in the case of an incident will require identification of vulnerability and vulnerability factors which may be unique to the event or location. Each partner retains their responsibility to operate within relevant data sharing legislation and guidance.

# 16 Key roles in response

## 16.1 Chair (SAM/TAM/SCG/TCG/RCG)

Chairing a multi-agency meeting brings its own unique challenges. Whilst it is accepted that most if not all Chairs will already have extensive experience of chairing meetings, there are additional factors that should be borne in mind that may not necessarily be encountered in normal, day-to-day meetings. Chairs should always look to find ways to improve liaison between partners and cells whilst maintaining an effective battle rhythm (schedule).

Some of these factors are as follows:

- Chairs of multi-agency structures should not act as the strategic representative of their organisation in the multi-agency meeting so should seek an additional organisational representative to attend.
- The Chair should make full use of the Strategic Leaders' Guide or the Tactical Leaders' Guide in order to prepare for the pre-, during and post-meeting phases of multi-agency meetings.
- As a minimum confirmatory check of the main multi-agency response processes, the Chair of the SCG and TCG should consider making early reference to the Incident Aide Memoires contained in the Strategic and Tactical Leaders' Guides.
- The Chair is not, and should not be expected to have specialist knowledge and experience of the capabilities and expertise of all organisations that are contributing to the multi-agency response. The Chair's role is to co-ordinate these elements in the most effective manner possible to meet the agreed Mission and Strategic Objectives.
- In order to achieve this, the Chair should endeavour to ensure that the right organisations are represented at the right level and with the appropriate degree of expertise in order to support co-ordinated action and activity. This should be reviewed throughout the incident as appropriate. The CCU has an extensive Contacts List that can help with this process.
- The Loggist has a vital role in supporting the Chair of any multi-agency meeting during an incident. However, the Chair remains accountable for the decisions and actions taken by any multi-agency meeting and **not** the Loggist.
- The Loggist is trained to meet briefly with the Chair before a multi-agency meeting in order to introduce him/herself and outline how they routinely go about completing the Log.
- Taking and maintaining an effective Log is all about teamwork between the Chair and the Loggist. The Chair must ensure that the Loggist records all decisions that are taken, some of which might be hard to capture given the speed of events, the technical nature of some of the terminology and the potential widespread use of acronyms.

- The Chair should summarise decisions and actions as the meeting progresses so that the Loggist and CCU officer maintaining the action log can confirm that they have been recorded.
- The Loggist may well ask the Chair to clarify a decision or action whilst the meeting is in progress in order to ensure that the Log is accurate.
- The Loggist (or CCU Support Officer) will be prepared to summarise the decisions and actions at the end of the multi-agency meeting, in accordance with the standard multi-agency agenda templates.
- The Loggist is trained to meet briefly with the Chair after a multi-agency meeting in order to ensure that the account in the Log is accurate.
- The Chair must sign the Log once he/she is happy that it is accurate.
- The Chair should remember that all decisions and actions at multi-agency meetings should be based on achieving a consensus across participating organisations.
- The Chair should nominate a Deputy at the earliest opportunity.

### 16.2 Loggists

In order to assure that an auditable and accountable record of the decisions, actions and rationale is maintained for the SAM, TAM, SCG, TCG and RCG, the SRF partnership is supported by trained Loggists who use standard Log Books.

The Loggist will work with the Chair of the meeting to ensure a log of action and decisions with rationale is maintained. They will also work with the CCU Support Officer to ensure the action log is produced in meetings and reflect the official log.

The Loggist is nominated by SRF partner organisations before then being trained to a consistent standard on a training course that is run by the CCU. The Unit has a list of trained Loggists and individual organisation's Loggist Co-ordinators that can help to source staff for forthcoming meetings.

### 16.3 Forward Control Officers

Forward Control Officers (as described by agencies such as local authorities but may be other roles e.g. site managers in other organisations) are the operational-level representatives for Cat 1 responder organisations at or very near the scene of an incident. As such, Forward Control Officers may be expected to do one or more of the following:

- Represent their organisation at operational meetings at scene
- Update their own organisation's internal major incident response and recovery structures.
- Request and oversee resources and capabilities on behalf of their organisational response
- Update the TCG.

The CCU provides a Forward Control Officer course that trains staff to a consistent level to be able to respond to incidents at the operational level. This course is aimed primarily, though not exclusively, at non-Emergency Service staff.

### 16.4 Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) – Support role

Whilst the Unit is very much geared to preparing for and supporting the response to, and recovery from an incident, the Unit's skills, capabilities and networks are equally useful to responders in a range of day-to-day incidents that fall way below the threshold of a major incident.

In summary, some of the main ways in which the CCU may be able to support responders during incidents are as follows:

- Providing specialist contingency planning advice to strategic, tactical and operational leaders, principally through the Unit's Duty Officer. The Duty Officer can be contacted 24/7 via the Shared Fire Control and asking for the Duty Officer to be paged.
- Establishing and supporting multi-agency response and recovery structures.
- Establishing a resources cell on request from SRF partner organisations to co-ordinate the response to an incident, the scope and/or impact of which is beyond routine daily response but is not likely to require the activation of a full multi-agency SCG/TCG structure. This facility would be based at the CCU and would most likely be implemented to provide up-to-date information to SRF partners during events such as severe weather/ snow.
- Providing specialist advice on Staffordshire Prepared Plans and related local, sub-national and national contingency plans.
- Warning and informing SRF partner organisations and key individuals via the Unit's Contact List.
- Deploying in support of SRF partner organisations, on request.
- Deploying the Mobile Control Unit (MCU) in support of SRF partner organisations, on request.
- Deploying the Multi-agency Mobile Co-ordination Post (MAMCP) in support of SRF partner organisations, on request.
- Accessing a comprehensive electronic database of layered maps on Resilience Direct relating specifically to Civil Contingencies.
- Establishing and supporting the maintenance of response pages on Resilience Direct.
- Warning and informing partners via Resilience Direct.
- Provision of Emergency Equipment via the Emergency Stores (approx. 400 cot beds and blankets); sourcing additional specialist equipment on request via the Unit's Contacts List.
- Access to a trained multi-agency Loggist and provision of Loggist Grab Box (including log books).
- Liaison with DLUHC (RED) to ensure that:
    - SRF partners are warned and informed.
    - Any SRF partnership requests for wider support are processed (e.g. mutual aid, activation of ResCG etc.).
    - The SRF partnership is upward reporting to UK Government in the required format and timing.
- Intelligence gathering regarding a specific risk when tasked by the Chair of the SRF.
- Tactical Adviser to the Chair of the TCG (see below).
- Strategic Adviser to the Chair of the SCG (see below).
- Operational Adviser to deployed Forward Control Officers.
- TCG Room Manager (see below)

It should be noted that the CCU has finite resources and these are likely to face considerable pressure and competing demands, particularly during an incident. It is therefore conceivable that the Unit may have to flexibly target its support to areas of greatest need/risk, with the sanction and support of the SCG. This approach would be subject to constant review as the situation develops and the requirements of SRF partners change.

### 16.4.1 Roles of the CCU in an emergency.

The role of the Strategic Adviser (to SCG Chair) includes:

- Facilitate the initiation of meeting/ group where necessary, liaising with lead responder & other responders, and assisting with the identification of Chair.

- Provide direction to CCU staff regarding roles and tasks.
- Advise and guide the Chair through the process of initiating and chairing the meeting/ group including agreeing the agenda and draft Terms of Reference with him/her.
- Encourage and support the Chair to draft a mission and strategic objectives to be presented to the meeting.
- Provide guidance on smooth running of strategic response, including advice on multi-agency plans.

The role of a Room Manager/Support includes:

- Support the CCU Strategic or Tactical Adviser.
- Assisting with practicalities of arranging meeting.
- Provide support at the meeting to Loggist as necessary.
- Promptly circulate the Action Log on RD after each meeting and ensure updates from action holders are added to the document.
- Provide access to multi-agency plans.
- Maintain up-to-date information boards in the TCG meeting room.

The role of the Tactical Adviser (to the TCG Chair) includes:

- Facilitate the initiation of group where necessary, liaising with lead responder & other responders.
- Agree the agenda and draft Terms of Reference with the Chair in advance of the meeting.
- Advise and guide Chair through the process of initiating and chairing the meeting/ group, being present throughout group/meeting.
- Provide guidance on smooth running of tactical response, including advice on multi-agency plans.
- Provide tactical advice to the Chair following each TCG meeting.

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# PART THREE: ANNEXES

# Annex A: Category 1 Responders

The following roles and responsibilities are referred to in support of a major incident or emergency response on the assumption that the organisation's services and responsibilities will also be delivered.

### 1.1 Staffordshire Police

The primary areas of police responsibility at a major incident are:

- The saving of life in conjunction with the other Emergency Services.
- The co-ordination of the Emergency Services, local authorities, media and other organisations acting in support at the scene of the incident.
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene and to control sightseers and traffic through the use of traffic control and cordons:
    - **Inner Cordon -** In conjunction with the Fire Service, provides immediate security of the rescue zone and potential crime scene.
    - **Outer Cordon -** Seal off an extensive controlled area surrounding the rescue zone. All access and exit points will be controlled and persons requesting access vetted. The control/command vehicles of the Emergency Services must be positioned between the inner and outer cordons.
    - **Traffic Control -** Deployed at or beyond the outer cordon preventing vehicular access to the area surrounding the scene.
- Press and media control (when the lead agency) in liaison with other Emergency Services and other responding agencies.
- The investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing of evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable.
- The collation and dissemination of casualty information.
- Management of Family and Friends Reception Centre.
- The identification of the dead on behalf of HM Coroner.
- Short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken.

https://www.staffordshire.police.uk/

### 1.2 Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service

The primary areas of Fire Service responsibility at a major incident are to:

- Rescue people trapped by fire, wreckage or debris.
- Assist other agencies in the rescuing of people trapped as a result of flooding.
- Prevent further escalation of an incident by controlling or extinguishing fires, rescuing people and undertaking other protective measures.
- Identify and deal with released chemicals or other contaminants in order to render the incident site safe or recommend exclusion zones.
- Ensure reasonable steps are taken to prevent or limit serious harm to the environment.
- Assist other agencies in the removal of large quantities of floodwater.
- Assist the ambulance service with casualty handling and if necessary the treatment of casualties.
- Assist the Police with the recovery of bodies.
- Liaise with the Police regarding the establishment of an inner cordon and if required manage gateways into the inner cordon. However, the responsibility for the health and safety of personnel working within the inner cordon remains with their individual agencies.

- On behalf of the NHS (MOU agreed), undertake mass decontamination of the general public in circumstances where large numbers of people have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances.
- Participate in investigations and preparation of reports with supporting evidence for subsequent inquiries.
- Stand-by to support during the non-emergency, recovery phase if requested.

http://www.staffordshirefire.gov.uk

### 1.3 West Midlands Ambulance Service

In conjunction with the other emergency services, the primary responsibilities of West Midlands Ambulance Service University NHS Foundation Trust (WMAS) are to save life and to treat injuries through effective emergency treatment and to transport casualties to hospital as safely and quickly as possible. WMAS will also:

- Provide a focal point for all NHS and medical resources at the scene.
- Despatch the MERIT (Medical Emergency Response Incident Team) to the scene.
- Despatch ambulance and paramedic units to the scene.
- To protect the health and safety of all medical personnel on site.
- Provide C4 (command, control, co-ordination & communications) for all medical assets on site and/or from ambulance control, in line with JESIP.
- Establish and determine casualty regulation, triage and treatment, and to provide treatment areas on site if appropriate.
- Establish an Ambulance loading point and arrange the most appropriate means of transporting the injured.
- To provide clinical decontamination of contaminated non-ambulant casualties on-site if appropriate.
- Determine and alert hospitals that will receive casualties from the incident.
- Inform UKHSA and NHS England.
- Issue a “Casualties Cleared” message to Receiving Hospitals once all casualties have been removed from the scene.
- Assist in the restoration of normality.

http://www.wmas.nhs.uk

### 1.4 Local Authorities

The principal concerns of Local Authorities include support for the Emergency Services, support and care for the local and wider community and co-ordination of the response by organisations other than the Emergency Services. As time goes on, and the emphasis switches to recovery, Local Authorities will take a leading role in community recovery and restoring the environment.

Generic Local Authority responsibilities include (note that in practice not all responsibilities will apply across all tiers (County/Unitary/District & Borough) of Local Authority):

**All LAs:**

- Alerting other Local Authorities and agencies as necessary.
- Assessing Local Authority involvement and co-ordinating its/their response.
- Alerting relevant internal Local Authority departments.

- Establishing liaison with appropriate Police command levels, including the deployment of Liaison Officers where necessary.
- Setting up Local Authority control and co-ordination arrangements as appropriate.
- Collecting, collating and disseminating information concerning the incident relevant to Local Authority involvement.
- Requesting military assistance in support of the Local Authority through the SCG.
- Establishing liaison with Government departments, public utilities and other organisations, as appropriate.
- Co-ordinating the Local Authority emergency response with adjacent areas.
- Establishing liaison with the lead responder's communications team to ensure the co-ordination of the release of information to the news media and the issue of information and advice to the public.
- Providing waste management support.
- Promoting Business Continuity advice to Businesses and Voluntary groups.
- Providing representatives to the SAM, TAM, SCG, TCG etc.

**Upper Tier LAs (City/County Council):**

- The management of the highway network, except trunk roads and motorways, within the SRF partnership area. This includes co-ordinating road closures and diversions. Other support includes facilitation of the incident response and distribution of cones/signage.
- Providing Emergency Welfare (EW) to stranded motorists.
- Alerting the appropriate Director of Public Health to all major incidents posing actual or potential toxic hazards including oil pollution so that an early assessment can be made of any possible threat to public health.
- Establishing and chairing the Recovery Co-ordinating Group and lead on the co-ordination of the recovery effort. The Staffordshire Prepared Recovery Plan contains more detailed information on the recovery process within the SRF partnership area.
- Providing advice and guidance on any animal health and welfare related issues (including the safe disposal of animal carcasses and by-products, dealing with contaminated animals and contaminated land/crops/pasture).
- Providing details of local business and emotional support groups specially established for the agricultural community.
- Liaison with schools within Local Authority control.
- Care for the elderly and the vulnerable.

**Lower Tier LAs (City/District/Borough Council):**

- Providing such services as are required including survivor reception centre, rest centres, and longer-term temporary accommodation, emergency feeding, assistance with travel and other welfare arrangements.
- Co-ordinating aftercare, in conjunction with the police, health authority and voluntary organisations.
- Providing Environmental Health support.
- Burial and cremation.

Staffordshire County Council: http://www.staffordshire.gov.uk/
Cannock Chase Council: https://www.cannockchasedc.gov.uk/
East Staffordshire Borough Council:
http://www.eaststaffsbc.gov.uk/Pages/default.aspx
Lichfield District Council: http://www.lichfielddc.gov.uk/
Newcastle Borough Council: https://www.newcastle-staffs.gov.uk/

Stafford Borough Council: http://www.staffordbc.gov.uk/
South Staffordshire District Council: https://www.sstaffs.gov.uk/
Staffordshire Moorlands District Council: http://www.staffsmoorlands.gov.uk/
Stoke-on-Trent City Council: http://www.stoke.gov.uk/
Tamworth Borough Council: http://www.tamworth.gov.uk/

### 1.4.1 Local Authority roles and responsibilities during a major incident

A brief summary of the roles and responsibilities of Local Authorities during a major incident is shown below:

| Responsibility | Upper Tier LA | Lower Tier LA |
|---|---|---|
| **Rest Centres** | | Lead Role |
| **Humanitarian Assistance Centres (HAC)** | Lead Role | Support Role |
| **Reservoir Plan** | Lead Role | Support Role |
| **Flood Plan** | Lead Role | Support Role |
| **Recovery** | Lead / Support Role (scale/geography dependant) | Lead / Support Role (scale/geography dependant) |
| **Mass Transportation** | Lead Role (if requirement is between 100-1000) | Lead Role (if requirement is between 0-100) |
| **Temporary Mortuary** | Lead Role (Requires SCC and SoTCC Director on Call permission) | |
| **Highways Emergency Welfare** | Lead Role | |
| **Town Centre Evacuation** | Lead Role (SoTCC) | Lead Role |
| **Animal Disease** | Lead | Support |
| **Education** | Lead | |
| **Public Heath** | Lead | |

## 1.5 NHS Funded Health organisations

Roles, responsibilities and functional requirements for NHS EPRR are set out within the NHSE EPRR Framework (2022). The minimum requirements which commissioners and providers of NHS-funded services must meet are set out in the current NHSE/I Core Standards for EPRR (Core Standards). These standards are in accordance with the CCA 2004 and the NHS Act 2006 (as amended), and reviewed annually.

NHS-funded organisations which are specifically categorised under the CCA 2004 (NHSE, NHS Ambulance Services, Acute Trusts and, as of July 2022, Integrated Care Boards) hold the same responsibilities as other Category 1 and 2 responders. Other NHS funded and commissioned originations not listed under the CCA 2004 (including community and mental health providers) are still expected to plan for and respond to emergencies and incidents in a manner which is relevant, necessary and proportionate to the scale and services provided.

The new Integrated Care Boards are responsible for planning for, responding to and leading recovery from incidents (EPRR), to ensure NHS and partner organisations are joined up at times of greatest need, including taking on local incident coordination responsibilities as delegated by NHSE.

### 1.5.1 United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA)

UKHSA provides an integrated approach to protecting UK public health through the provision of public health support and advice to the NHS, local authorities, emergency services, other arms-length bodies, the Department of Health and Devolved Administrations. Specialist advice areas include infectious diseases, outbreak surveillance, chemical, biological and radiation hazards.

UKHSA is responsible for providing public health Emergency Preparedness Resilience and Response leadership and scientific and technical advice at all organisational levels, working in partnership with other organisations to protect the public.

at https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-health-security-agency

### 1.5.2 NHS England

The generic EPRR role and responsibilities of NHS England are:

- To set a risk based EPRR strategy for the NHS.
- To ensure there is a comprehensive NHS EPRR system and assure itself and DHSC that the system is fit for purpose.
- Lead the mobilisation of the NHS in the event of an emergency at incidents levels 3 and above.
- Work with UKHSA and DHSC, where appropriate, to develop joint response arrangements.
- Undertake its responsibilities as a Category 1 responder under the CCA 2004.

NHS England operates:

- Nationally
- Regionally

**NHS England National Team**

At a national level NHS England will:

- Support the Accountable Emergency Officers (AEOs) to discharge EPRR duties.
- Participate in national multi-agency planning processes including risk assessment, exercising and assurance.
- Provide leadership and co-ordination to the NHS and national information on behalf of the NHS during periods of national incidents.
- Provide assurance to DHSC of the ability of the NHS to respond to incidents including assurance of capacity and capability to meet National Risk Assessment (NRA) requirements as they affect the health service.
- Provide support to DHSC in their role to UK central government response to emergencies.
- Consider all requests from NHS organisations for military assistance, once all other avenues are exhausted.

**NHS England Regional Team – NHS England (Midlands)**

Staffordshire falls under the remit of the Midlands region. At a regional level, NHS England will:

- Ensure integration of plans across the region to deliver a unified NHS response to incidents, including ensuring the provision of surge capacity.
- Maintain capacity and capability to co-ordinate the regional NHS response to an incident 24/7.
- Work with relevant partners through the LHRP & LRF structures.

- Seek assurance through the local LHRP and commissioners that the core standards are met and that each local health systems can effectively respond to and recover from incidents.
- Discharge the local NHS England EPRR duties as a Category 1 responder under the CCA 2004.

NHS England — Midlands

### 1.5.3 Acute Trusts

Staffordshire is covered by two Acute Hospital Trusts, with A&E Departments:

1. University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust (UHNM),
   Royal Stoke University Hospital,
   Newcastle Road,
   Stoke-on-Trent,
   ST4 6QG

   - Royal Stoke University Hospital A&E Department located on Newcastle Road able to accept all categories of patient including CBRNE/HAZMAT (Major Trauma Centre or MTC) on a 24/7 basis.
   - County Hospital (Stafford) A&E located on Weston Road, Stafford, able to accept all but the most serious injured or ill patients including CBRNE/HAZMAT. Opening hours 08:00hrs to 22:00hrs 7 days a week. Walk-In centre available.

2. University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust (UHDB)
   Uttoxeter Road
   DERBY
   DE22 3NE

   - UHDB has an A&E located on Belvedere Road, Burton able to accept all but the most seriously injured and CBRNE/HAZMAT on a 24/7 basis.
   - Sir Robert Peel Hospital, Plantation Lane, Mile Oak, Tamworth, Minor Injuries Unit only.
   - Samuel Johnson Community Hospital, Trent Valley Road, Lichfield, Minor Injuries Unit only.
   - UHDB formally reports for health via Derby and Derbyshire ICB as lead commissioner, but participates in the SRF structures.

Illness and Injury Response

- A hospital which has an Accident & Emergency (A&E) Department is sometimes called an Emergency Department (ED).
- This means that the Ambulance Service will routinely present patients to the hospital A&E for treatment and possible convalescence within the hospital.
- The hospital A&E will accept patients who self-present for treatment.
- The hospital A&E will in both of the above cases triage patients according to medical need.
- Not all Hospital Trusts can accept all patients; depending on medical need (severity of the illness or injury), the Ambulance Service will also triage patients and transport the patient to the nearest most appropriate hospital. Each of the major hospitals has a pre-agreed number and category of patient that they would be sent in a major incident and WMAS has details of this.
- Within Staffordshire, only University Hospital North Staffordshire can accept the most seriously ill or injured patients.

- Not all A&E Departments are open 24 hours a day.
- Some types of illness or injury, such as burn injuries, may be taken outside of Staffordshire for specialist treatment.
- In addition to A&E Departments, Hospital Trusts will have Minor Injury Units (MIU), GP Referral Units or Walk-in Centres, which can treat minor injuries; these will not normally accept patients presented by ambulance.
- Will liaise with other neighbouring hospitals where the 'decant' of patients from one hospital to another is required.
- Liaises with the Ambulance Service, CCGs and NHS England, in order to manage the impact of the incident.
- Will liaise with UKHSA where appropriate, for advice on treatment.
- Has a communications policy to liaise with relatives and friends of existing patients and those from the incident, the Casualty Bureau, the local community, the media and VIPs.
- Is able to set up a Control Room if necessary.
- Will have Mortuary facilities.

CBRNe/HAZMAT Response

- Provides limited decontamination facilities and personal protective equipment to manage contaminated self-presenting casualties. Royal Stoke and County Hospitals both have demountable CBRNe facilities for wet decontamination; Queen's Hospital Burton has standard tents.
- Will request Fire & Rescue Service assistance on mass decontamination.

1.6 **Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent Integrated Care Board** (ICB/ICS)

The ICB's general Emergency Planning, Resilience and Response role and responsibilities are to:

- Fulfil the relevant duties under the CCA 2004 and the requirements in respect of emergencies within the NHS Act 2006 and the Health and Care Act 2022
- Co-chair the Local Health Resilience Partnership (LHRP) and maintain the involvement and support of LHRP partners at strategic and tactical level
- Ensure appropriate director level representation at the SRF
- Represent the system at sub-groups of the SRF, namely SRF Tactical and the Risk Assessment Working Group, ensuring a feedback loop is in place to consult with NHS providers and escalate issues as appropriate on behalf of the system
- Provide a route of escalation for resilience planning issues to the LHRP in respect of commissioned provider EPRR preparedness
- Provide annual assurance against the NHS EPRR Core Standards, including by monitoring each commissioned provider's compliance with their contractual obligations in respect of EPRR and with applicable Core Standards
- Work in partnership with commissioned services to:
    - Take appropriate steps for securing that the organisation and wider NHS system is properly prepared for dealing with a relevant emergency
    - Ensure contracts with provider organisations contain relevant emergency preparedness, resilience (including business continuity) and response elements
    - Support NHS England in discharging its emergency preparedness, resilience and response functions and duties locally
    - Seek assurance that provider organisations are properly prepared to deal with an emergency, and are compliant with relevant guidance and standards

ICB incident response role and responsibilities:

- Deliver effective EPRR arrangements for business continuity, critical, or major incidents which may occur, to enable the effective and efficient prevention, reduction, control, mitigation of, and response to emergencies.
- Ensure the necessary resources are in place to plan for and respond effectively to such incidents, including representing the Integrated Care System and wider health economy within a tactical coordination role in incidents requiring multi-agency response; establish an effective incident control centre as required; and lead post-incident recovery for the local health economy.
- Support and coordinate Level 1 and 2 incidents respectively within its area of operations, and will provide support to NHS England Midlands Region in the response to Level 3 and 4 incidents
- Ensure robust escalation procedures are in place to respond to disruption to delivery of patient services
- Develop and maintain incident response arrangements in collaboration with all NHS-funded organisations and partner organisations
- Establish a mechanism to provide NHS strategic and tactical leadership and support structures to effectively manage and coordinate the NHS response to, and recovery from, incidents and emergencies, 24/7. This will include representing the NHS at Strategic Coordinating Groups and Tactical Coordinating Groups
- Support Integrated Care System tactical coordination during incidents (level 2–4 incidents)
- Chair and coordinate the Local NHS response through the Local NHS Strategic Command group (formerly the "Health Economy Tactical Coordination Group") as a sub-group of the TCG/SCG as appropriate
- Ensure that there is an effective process for the identification, recording, implementation and sharing of lessons identified through response to incidents and emergencies and participation in exercises and debrief events

### 1.7 Environment Agency

The Environment Agency works to create better places for people and wildlife, and support sustainable development. They have fourteen areas within England and each is responsible for responding to incidents within their geographical boundary.

In Staffordshire, they are represented by the Area Director for West Midlands Area (who covers Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Midlands, Shropshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Gloucestershire). Please note that a small part of Staffordshire falls within the Greater Manchester, Merseyside and Cheshire Area.

They are responsible for:

- Regulating major industry and waste.
- Treatment of contaminated land.
- Water quality and resources.
- Fisheries.
- Inland river, estuary and harbour navigations.
- Conservation and ecology.
- Managing the risk of flooding from main rivers, reservoirs, estuaries and the sea.

Their priorities are to:

- Work with businesses and other organisations to manage the use of resources.
- Increase the resilience of people, property and businesses to the risks of flooding and coastal erosion.

- Protect and improving water, land and biodiversity.
- Improve the way we work as a regulator to protect people and the environment and support sustainable growth.

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/environment-agency

**1.8 British Transport Police**

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## Annex B: Category 2 Responders

All Cat 2 responders would provide support to the SCG and/or individual Cat 1 responders on request. The following overview of Cat 2 responders' capabilities is intended to assist Cat 1 responders and the CCU in understanding what resources and skills each organisation may be able to bring to bear in a flood event. The CCU Duty Officer has contact arrangements with all of the organisations listed.

### 1.2 Severn Trent Water (STW)

In the event of an incident which adversely affects the supply of water, Severn Trent will distribute alternative water supplies, usually in the form of bottled water or through water tanks. However, the priority will always be to keep people on supply by reconfiguring and/or tankering potable water directly into the water distribution network.

Water companies are regulated under the Security and Emergency Directive 1998 to supply 10 Litres per head per day in the event of a supply interruption or water quality event. This rises to 20 Litres per head per day after 5 days. Priority will be given to vulnerable customers/institutions, for example, hospitals, schools, prisons and nursing homes where possible. Severn Trent have "Alternative Water Supply" plans in place detailing how this would be carried out.

If populations exceeding 50,000 urban or 30,000 rural properties are without a potable supply, a major incident will be declared and Severn Trent will need multi-agency support. A representative from the relevant water company will be sent to liaise with the SCG. On occasions, agencies within the LRFs will be informed of incidents below these thresholds and in some cases third party support may be requested.

Severn Trent also provides waste water services. These can also be impacted by incidents, including burst rising mains, flammable or toxic discharges entering to sewer and fluvial or pluvial flooding. A worst-case scenario would typically be a release of untreated wastewater into a river.

Severn Trent maintains a register of vulnerable and sensitive customers that can be used in an emergency. The water industry operates a mutual aid agreement which facilitates the sharing of plant and equipment during emergencies.

http://www.stwater.co.uk/

### 1.3 South Staffs Water (SSW)

SSW has robust emergency plans in place to enable them to maintain the national minimum standard of 10 litres of water per person per day during an incident affecting a population of up to 30,000 customers. For larger incidents affecting greater numbers of customers, SSW is able to call assistance via Mutual Aid from other water companies. They have increased their level of resilience on other utilities in order to maintain water supplies for example, where electricity is critical to run pumps etc., they have installed standby generators. There is limited interconnectivity with other water utilities that can be utilised if necessary.

- Where there is any 'long term' customer outage, they may request assistance with logistics and the distribution of water to customers from LRF partner organisations.

- SSW maintains a Priority Services Register, which customers can sign up to if they need additional assistance or are vulnerable for some reason, including being on Dialysis. The list relies on customers to self-register with the Company.
- They do keep records of vulnerable sites such as hospitals but expect to get accurate information regarding schools, 'care homes' and other care related sites from the Local Authorities on request via the CCU.

http://www.south-staffs-water.co.uk

### 1.4 Cadent Gas Distribution Ltd (Gas)

Cadent own and operate the gas National Transmission System for GB and own a number of the Gas Distribution Networks including the West Midlands from where it is distributed to households and industry, however only Cadent transmit in Staffordshire. They do not produce gas for the UK market and do not own the gas conveyed through their networks. The company is responsible as a Category 2 responder for its pipelines and critical sites in Staffordshire, all of which have extensive contingencies plans, and under their Category 2 responsibilities, play a role in regional and local Resilience Forums. To contact Cadent regarding operational gas emergencies, including formation of a strategic team, the following 24 hour numbers should be used: 0800 111 999 (all) or 0800 917 2414 (non-public).

http://cadentgas.com/Home

### 1.5 National Highways (NH)

NH is an executive agency of the Department for Transport (DfT). It is responsible for the construction, improvement, maintenance and operation of the Strategic Road Network (SRN) of England (in Scotland and Wales the devolved administrations have responsibility for transport). The SRN is made up of motorways and primary A roads known as All Purpose Trunk Roads (APTR). Staffordshire sits within the NH Midlands region, with the network being operated from West Midlands Regional Control Centre, Quinton, Birmingham (WM RCC).

NH will have an interest in any major incident or Emergency that affects safety or flow of traffic on the strategic road network and/or involves damage to the road infrastructure. The response would include, but is not limited to:

- Provision of traffic management.
- Implementation of suitable diversion routes.
- Provision of traffic information via Matrix Signs, Web and Media.
- Provision of representatives to command and co-ordination groups.
- Provision of technical expertise to command and co-ordination groups (structural engineers etc.).
- Repair / reinstatement of physical infrastructure.
- Support, where appropriate, a multi-agency delivery as a partner in LRF activities / responses.

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/highways-england

### 1.6 Electrical distribution

Electricity distributors are heavily regulated by OFGEM and are a Category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). National Grid Electricity Distribution (NGRED) has an obligation to cooperate with Category 1 responders to plan for emergencies and meet the needs of those who may be vulnerable in emergencies. National Grid transmits electricity on a national level and NGRED are the Distribution Network Operators (DNO) who distribute electricity on a local level, including throughout Staffordshire. WPD customers who are vulnerable and dependent upon electricity for medical and communication needs are able to join NGRED Priority Services Register via the customer's electricity supplier or directly with NGRED. NGRED have an agreement to provide specific information to Category 1 responders as part of their response to an emergency situation where there is a need for the identification of vulnerable people and can be obtained via the 24/7 number 0800 678 3105 (option 1) or for exercises via their Emergency Planning Officer. Any personal data provided is only to be used for the purpose of identifying and assisting those vulnerable people of households affected.

https://www.nationalgrid.com/electricity-distribution

### 1.7 Network Rail

Network Rail is the main rail infrastructure controller for the UK. They are responsible for any incidents on the rail network regardless of which Train Operating Company, if any are involved in the incident. Incidents occurring in the private sidings or depots are the responsibility of their respective owners or operators.

http://www.networkrail.co.uk/

### 1.8 Train Operating Companies (TOCs)

Due to the nature of their business and their commercial status, the TOCs have robust and resilient plans in place that are regularly tested in combating real life scenarios. Companies that operate a service in the SRF area are:

- London North Western Railway: https://www.londonnorthwesternrailway.co.uk
- Cross Country Trains: http://www.crosscountrytrains.co.uk/
- East Midlands Trains: http://www.eastmidlandstrains.co.uk/
- Avanti West Coast https://www.avantiwestcoast.co.uk/
- West Midlands Trains https://www.westmidlandsrailway.co.uk/

### 1.9 Airport Operators

The SRF area has three international airports (Birmingham, East Midlands and Manchester) close to its borders and its operators are Cat 2 responders, in accordance with their definition under section 82(1) of the Airports Act 1986 (c.31). The only airport within the SRF area is a small business airport known as Wolverhampton Halfpenny Green Airport. However, this does not meet the criteria under the CCA 2004 and the Airports Act 1986; therefore, it is neither a Cat 1 nor Cat 2 responder.

Wolverhampton Halfpenny Green Airport: http://www.wolverhamptonairport.co.uk/

### 1.10 Health & Safety Executive (HSE)

HSE is the national independent watchdog for work-related health, safety and illness.
They are an independent regulator and act in the public interest to reduce work-related death and serious injury across Great Britain's workplaces. The HSE will have a key role in incident-related investigations in the response and recovery phases. The main interface with local resilience partners outside of incidents is the scrutiny and enforcement of COMAH on-site and off-site plans.

http://www.hse.gov.uk/

### 1.11 Airwave (Communications Network)

Airwave is a secure and reliable method of communication used by the Emergency Services. The widespread adoption by the Emergency Services allows for interoperability using the same communications network. The network is secure and resilient with excellent backup capabilities. It has a wider coverage and works when mobile networks have been overloaded or failed.

https://www.airwavesolutions.co.uk/home/

### 1.12 Mobile Telecommunications Network

Mobile communications have very good coverage across the UK. However, the networks are prone to being overloaded during a major incident and can fail. Under the Mobile Telecommunications Privilege Access Scheme (MTPAS), pre-registered Cat 1 and 2 responder SIMs will have priority to the network and therefore a greater chance of making a connection. This prevents overloading during a major incident.

### 1.13 Landline Telecommunications

Landlines are hardwired into most homes and businesses. The lines themselves are vulnerable to being damaged or cut off during an incident as the wires are suspended at roof level. Often the fixed phones themselves rely on mains power to function. The advantage of landline phones is they are less likely to overload than mobile communications. Like mobile providers, there are many different companies offering a range of services.

### 1.3 Met Office

The Met Office can aid responders with information for emergency planning and response to weather related incidents such as severe weather warnings, plume predictions and storm tide alerts. They are also able to provide advice on the interpretation of data and the impact of weather related emergencies. They will:

- Provide early intelligence of potential inclement weather
- Provide timely weather warnings
- Provide advice on weather patterns and forecast

http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/

### 1.15 Coal Authority

The Coal Authority is an arm's length public body sponsored by the Department for Energy Security & Net Zero (DESNZ). Our head office is in Mansfield, Nottinghamshire but we have staff working remotely across England, Scotland and Wales. We are responsible for managing the safety issues that have resulted from years of coal mining, dealing with water pollution caused by historical coal mining, communicating information to the public and making our information available so that informed decisions can be made. In an emergency we provide a 24/7 response capability.

# Annex C: Other organisations

## 1.1 Department for Levelling Up Housing and Communities DLUHC (RED) role in an Emergency

During an emergency RED will provide a Strategic Government Liaison Officer (GLO) to a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) to support the LRF's response, and act as the two-way communication channel with central government. In some cases, the GLO might be different to the designated Strategic Resilience Adviser and sometimes the presence will be virtual (by phone) rather than physical.

During the response phase, the GLO will also act as a Recovery Liaison Officer (RLO) on any Recovery Group set up by the SCG to act as a link between the Lead Government Department and the LRF Recovery Working Group. During the recovery phase the RLO will provide advice and support on matters within DLUHC fields of responsibility (e.g. housing, planning, Bellwin Scheme).

Where appropriate, RED will also organise multi-LRF Response Co-ordination Groups (ResCGs) usually by teleconference, to help facilitate cross-LRF communication, mutual aid and support. ResCGs may also be set up at the request of the LRF.

This has been agreed as the principle areas where the RED Resilience Adviser will support and assist Staffordshire Local Resilience Forum.

This sets out the focus and scope of the current engagement. It is not an exhaustive list and is subject to regular review.

## 1.2 NHS Community and Mental Health Trusts

Community and Mental Health Trusts, while not categorised under the CCA 2004, still have emergency preparedness, resilience and response obligations under the NHS Act 2006 and/or the NHS Standard Contract – including the provision of whatever support and assistance may reasonably be required by Integrated Care Boards, NHS England and/or UK Health Security Agency in response to any national, regional or local public health emergency or incident. However, within Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent the two Trusts plan and work as a Category 1 responder.

Mental Health Trusts:

- Support Local Health Economy capacity to safely manage the additional demand.
- Provide access to additional resources.
- Work with NHS England North Midlands Team to support the recovery phase.
- Link with NHS England North Midlands Team in co-ordinating services.
- Work with the local health economy to ensure patients involved in the incident are discharged home with appropriate support in the community.
- Provide continuity of core business services during incidents.

**Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust** (MPFT) – a Community and Mental Health Trust: https://www.mpft.nhs.uk/

**North Staffordshire Combined Healthcare NHS Trust** (NSCHT): - a Mental Health Trust: https://combined.nhs.uk/

## 1.4 Military

The Military is a key resilience partner and is often requested to support multi-agency response and recovery efforts. During the response to a major incident, the primary point of contact for all matters relating to Military advice and/or support is through the Joint Resilience Liaison Officer (JRLO), an Army Lieutenant Colonel based at MOD Donnington (Telford). The JRLO should be invited to attend the SCG and Military Liaison Officers would then attend the TCG and/or operational levels, if requested and approved.

During a major Incident, the Military may decide to co-ordinate its response and recovery efforts on a more formal footing through the activation of its Brigade Operations Room. This contains a wealth of communications capabilities, many of which are interoperable with systems that are used by the SRF partnership (e.g. Airwave radios).

The following additional factors should be borne in mind by SRF partners when working with the Military in a major incident:

- The term 'Military' encompasses the Army, Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF). Both the RN and RAF have their own resilience leads who can provide specialist advice and guidance to an SCG. However, in each case, co-ordination of overall resilience activity remains with the JRLO.

- The Military is not bound by the CCA 2004 and is therefore not a Cat 1 or Cat 2 responder.

- Not all Military support may be provided at zero cost. In very general terms, life-saving activities do not incur a cost, whilst non-life-saving activities may. This will depend on the exact circumstances of each request and this should be based on two factors: consultation with the JRLO and reference to the latest guidance produced by the Ministry of Defence, which is included in the Strategic Leaders' Guide and can also be accessed via the CCU.

- Requests for Military support made through the JRLO should always be 'effects-based'. This means that the request should outline what the current problem is and the resulting outcome that is being sought (e.g. "We need to evacuate 50 people from their homes to a safe place as they are surrounded by rising flood water"). The Military can then use their own expertise and knowledge of their existing and most readily available resources to come up with a suggested solution. This approach is distinctly different to a specific request for resources, based on the knowledge and expertise of SRF partners (e.g. "We need a couple of helicopters to airlift some stranded people from their homes"). This pre-supposes that this is the best and most readily available solution; often this is not the case and can actually lead to frustration and delay in implementing what might be the best course of action for all concerned.

- A request for Military assistance will trigger a formal administrative process through the Military's national Chain of Command. This process is part authorisation and part formal planning, both of which are essential ingredients to activating any specific Military tasking in support of the SRF partnership. It should be borne in mind that this process may inevitably take some time. **On no account should SRF partners attempt to circumvent this necessary and nationally-agreed process by seeking to broker ad-hoc arrangements with local Military units.**

- For NHS organisations and requests to support NHS structures, there is a specific request process through NHS regional and national processes that must be followed that is separate to the LRF request process.

- The CCU has electronic copies of the agreed Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) Request Form and hard copies are provided at the back of the Strategic Leaders' Guide. This form should be followed and, if required, completed by the CCU and the JRLO in order to formally request Military support in a major incident. CCU staff are familiar with this process and they will always complete it in close co-operation with the JRLO.

### 1.5 Staffordshire Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU)

See sections 8.24 and 16.12.

http://www.staffordshireprepared.gov.uk/

### 1.6 Association of British Insurers (ABI)

The ABI is requested to advise the Chair of the SCG, when invited, on all matters relating to strategic policy for claims across the insurance industry. This advice, if requested, is to be co-ordinated with the multi-agency Media and Communications Plan and any local communication strategies being undertaken by Local Authorities /wider partners.

https://www.abi.org.uk/

### 1.7 Kenyon International

Kenyon International Emergency Services are an international disaster response capability primarily concerning mass casualty incidents. They can provide mass fatalities support in the form of temporary mortuaries and victim identification. Their closest base is in London, they can provide support for large-scale incidents as a fall-back from local Mass Casualty plans.

http://www.kenyoninternational.com/

### 1.8 Leavesley International

Leavesley International supplies support to the response to an emergency by offering access to their buildings and resources. Based in Burton upon Trent, they provide storage, accommodation and technical assistance to the SRF's Mass Fatalities arrangements as well as supporting requests for resources and a gateway to the local business community.

http://www.leavesley-international.com/

### 1.9 Voluntary Organisations

A Voluntary Sector Group exists in the SRF area, comprised of organisations that can be called upon to respond to or support those affected by, an emergency. However, the main Voluntary Organisations, which can support the response to incidents in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent, are as follows:

- ASSIST
- British Red Cross
- National Flood Forum
- Rotary
- Multi-faith partners
- Peak District Mountain Rescue Organisation (PDMRO)

- RAYNET
- RSPCA
- Salvation Army
- Samaritans
- Staffordshire Search and Rescue Team (SSART)
- St John Ambulance
- Canal and River Trust
- Support Staffordshire
- VAST

All these organisations can be contacted through the CCU Duty Officer.

#### 1.9.1 ASSIST

ASSIST can do on-site support for anyone with sensory/autism issues, or deaf/blind support in an evacuation and/or shelter scenario, or at a rest centre. They also have sensory-trained councillors who can assist with ongoing emotional support beyond the front door contact.

https://www.staffordshire.gov.uk/education/ASSIST/home.aspx

#### 1.9.2 British Red Cross

The British Red Cross can provide voluntary support through a number of capabilities, including:

- Rest centre support and management
- Ambulance support
- First aid provision
- Logistics support
- Psychosocial support
- International family tracing
- Refugee support
- Welfare provision and support
- Disaster appeals scheme management
- Telephone support line.

http://www.redcross.org.uk/

#### 1.9.3 National Flood Forum (NFF)

The NFF is a charity to help, support and people at risk of flooding.

https://nationalfloodforum.org.uk/

#### 1.9.4 Rotary

Rotary is a global network of volunteers who come together to make positive, lasting change in communities at home and abroad. There are volunteers who are locally based in Staffordshire and can provide support to a voluntary cell in the TCG.

### 1.9.5 Multi-Faith Partners

Multi-faith partners are a group of representatives from a number of faiths. They can be engaged on matters of emergency planning and provide spiritual/cultural care and support to any persons involved in an incident:

- Emotional support to those affected.
- Advice to Cat 1 responders.
- Facilitate faith services and prayers.
- Provide facilities for worship.
- Provide information on places of worship in the community.
- Potentially provide assistance at sites that may be set up following a major incident/emergency, which could include rest centres.
- Assistance on issues to deal with equality and diversity for all those affected or involved in a major incident/emergency.

### 1.9.6 Peak District Mountain Rescue Organisation (PDMRO)

PDMRO provide upland search and rescue in the peak district as well as lowland search and rescue capabilities. It operates in Eastern Staffordshire but is able to respond outside this boundary. PDMRO offer assistance to the Emergency Services in major incidents as well as smaller scale specialist rescues from difficult/ inaccessible places:

- The provision of search and rescue, primarily in upland areas. In particular to work with any of the three Emergency Services.
- To search countryside, farmland, woodland and moors, rivers and open areas of water for missing persons.
- To treat and evacuate casualties from difficult or inaccessible places.
- To assist at major incidents, such as aircraft crashes.

http://www.pdmro.org.uk/

### 1.9.7 RAYNET

Radio Amateurs Emergency Network (RAYNET) offers voluntary support in emergency communications, during major incidents and large events. RAYNET is able to operate when mobile networks have been overloaded and uses a wide range of equipment to ensure continuing communications:

- Point to point radio communication over all terrains, where accessible.
- Network communication via radio.
- Hand portable, mobile, portable and fixed station.

http://www.raynet-uk.net/

### 1.9.8 RSPCA

The RSPCA is a charity that is involved in almost anything that relates to the welfare of animals. It has specialist rescue teams and expertise that allow it to ensure the welfare of animals during major incidents. It will:

- Respond to calls in relation to animals whose welfare is compromised, i.e., complaints of cruelty for domestic and agricultural animals.

- Respond to injured animals (domestic, agricultural and wildlife); however, in relation to domestic and farmed animals the owner is ultimately responsible.
- Give advice on any animal welfare related matters.
- Respond to rescues of trapped animals, where they often work in conjunction with Fire and Rescue Services. It has a team of trained and equipped officers to deal with flood situations such as rescues requiring boats, rope teams, etc.

http://www.rspca.org.uk/home

**1.9.9 Salvation Army**

The Salvation Army provides support to the Emergency Services in major incidents in the form of welfare, such as its self-sufficient canteen vehicles and Rest Centre Assistance. Its support also allows the Emergency Services to collect and donate food to victims of major incidents, such as people displaced by flooding.

http://www.salvationarmy.org.uk/

**1.9.10 Samaritans**

Samaritans offer confidential emotional support over the phone from a number of call centres. People affected by a major incident can call and speak to a trained volunteer.

http://www.samaritans.org/

**1.9.11 Staffordshire Search and Rescue Team (SSART)**

SSART is a volunteer search and rescue team based in Staffordshire. The organisation has specialist skills:

- Search and rescue for high risk lost/missing persons.
- National Search and Rescue Dog Association (NSARDA) qualified air scenting search dogs.
- Swift water rescue/ flooding rescue (work primarily with Fire & Rescue Service)
- Support to multi-agency partners during incident response, including cordons, communication and navigation.
- Some capability in rope rescue and First Person On Scene (first aid) trained as well as some DBS cleared team members for extra safety.

http://www.ssart.org/

**1.9.12 St John Ambulance**

St John Ambulance offer first aid support at large events and major incidents, it has teams of trained first aiders and ambulances that can take the pressure off the Ambulance Service in a major incident.

https://www.sja.org.uk/sja/default.aspx

**1.9.13 Canal & River Trust (formerly British Waterways)**

The canal system is maintained 'full' at all times in order to provide navigable waterways whenever possible. Canal water is never still; it has a discernible current from the ingress of water into the system via reservoirs and rivers, to the egress into the rivers system and out to sea. The Canal & River Trust has a network of specialist water engineers to enable it to perform its primary functions.

However, if operational circumstances permit, it is available to offer specialist advice and assistance and can advise on all matters relating to:

- Canal levels
- Access to canals for pumping operations
- Dam/reservoir inundation plans and related flood models

http://canalrivertrust.org.uk/

**1.9.14 Support Staffordshire**

Support Staffordshire is the countywide service for voluntary and community organisations in Staffordshire. They operate a number of equipped Volunteer Centers across Staffordshire that could be utilised in an emergency. These are located at:

- Cannock Chase
- East Staffordshire
- Lichfield & District
- Stafford
- Staffordshire Moorlands
- Tamworth

https://www.supportstaffordshire.org.uk/

## Annex D: References


- Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (2008) *Glossary* [online] (7 May 2008)
- Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (HM Government)
- The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2012 (HM Government)
- Emergency Preparedness (HM Government)
- Emergency Response and Recovery (HM Government)
- National Recovery Guidance (HM Government)
- Guidance on Emergency Procedures (2009) (Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)/National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA))
- Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods: An Independent Review by Sir Michael Pitt (2008)
- Staffordshire Prepared Strategic Leaders' Guide
- UK Concept of Operations (HM Government)
- UK Government Resilience Framework
- Civil Contingencies Unit Training & Exercise Programme
- Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience – Joint Doctrine Publication 02 (2nd Edition)
- Health Emergency Planning: A Handbook for Practitioners
- Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) (NHS England)


## Glossary

For a comprehensive guide to terms and acronyms used in this handbook, please follow the link to the Lexicon on the Gov.uk website: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon  Please note that as of April 2023, the Lexicon content is subject to consultation with UK responders and a revised version will be published in due course.